Will Yeouido's 'third force' falter again?

 

In the April 2024 general election in Korea, emerging political factions signaled a potential realignment of the country's traditional political landscape. The Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), led by former Justice Minister Cho Kuk, secured 24 percent of votes for proportional representation seats, while the Reform Party, a center-right coalition led by former People Power Party (PPP) leader Lee Jun-seok, also managed to garner considerable attention, primarily due to Lee's first-ever electoral victory and its strategy to capitalize on youth voters.

The rally of these “third force” political movements was met with both anticipation and skepticism. While questions persisted about whether the RKP, a splinter group from the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), embodied the traditional third force concept, typically characterized by an ideologically centrist approach that transcends partisan divides, many voters hoped that these new political entities could act as potential catalysts for breaking the nation's polarized political system.

Simultaneously, it was also clear from the outset that the success of these emerging parties could not be sustained without addressing several challenges, including resolving legal risks associated with leadership, reducing overreliance on individual personalities and forming a collective caucus (also referred to as a negotiation group) to project their influence. Unfortunately, none of these strategic imperatives have been realized, and the prospects for these third-party alternatives have become increasingly precarious.

The most recent example of this is an intensified internal rift within the Reform Party, centered on tensions between party leader Her Eun-a and her predecessor Lee. The power struggle between the two figures led Lee's loyalists to strategize the removal of Her from leadership, with Her announcing potential legal action in response. The conflict transcended leadership, manifesting in verbal and physical confrontations of party staffers and supporters, highlighting the party's internal divisions to the public.

The RKP, despite appearing more unified, also faces critical challenges. In December, the party suffered a critical blow when the Supreme Court confirmed a two-year prison term for leader Cho, resulting in the forfeiture of his congressional seat and a five-year ban from presidential candidacy. The indictment, combined with the party's limited legislative influence, occurred at the most inopportune moment, reinforcing perceptions that the party differs little from the DPK despite efforts to brand itself as an alternative.

These developments have accelerated the declining popularity of third force political alternatives, a trend initially signaled by their failure to secure any victories in the October by-elections. Recent surveys by Gallup and RealMeter demonstrate the extent of this decline, with support for the Reform Party and RKP in January reaching historic lows of 2 and 4 percent, respectively. The ongoing martial law crisis has paradoxically solidified the polarization of Korean politics, with the DPK and the PPP experiencing upticks in support through increasingly antagonistic political narratives.

However, the failure of the third force wave stems not only from the parties themselves but also from systematic limitations within Yeouido's political infrastructure. Most notably, the semi-mixed proportional representation system utilized in the general elections severely constrained these parties' potential by limiting proportional representation seats to 46 out of 300, the electoral mechanism fundamentally restricting their political influence. This structural impediment was particularly consequential, as it prevented these smaller parties from meeting the 20-member threshold required to form a caucus, which would have provided financial support and committee representation essential for smaller political entities to establish a meaningful presence in central politics.

Consequently, their limited negotiating power relegated them to the political periphery. Major political issues were dictated by the two dominant parties, with smaller parties effectively sidelined during conflicts over major political issues, including controversies surrounding President Yoon Suk Yeol and the first lady, pension reforms and Cabinet impeachment proceedings.

As these alternative parties failed to sustain their initial momentum, internal tensions intensified. The political vulnerability of individual members who previously broke away from major parties became increasingly apparent, and individual political survival naturally superseded considerations of party sustainability — a recurring pattern in the history of third force movements, most notably exemplified by the collapse of Ahn Cheol-soo's People's Party.

The significance of a well-intentioned third force movement extends beyond immediate electoral mathematics. These political alternatives not only provide a meaningful option for citizens experiencing growing political apathy but also put pressure on the two established parties to adopt more centrist positions to secure their voter base. This dynamic becomes particularly critical given the current hyperpolarized nature of Korean politics, where psychological and physical animosity between party leadership and voters have reached unprecedented levels.

The survival and potential revival of these smaller parties hinge on their ability to swiftly manage internal crises and restructure with a focused emphasis on key issues that can secure a dedicated voter faction. The upcoming months, regardless of potential presidential election developments, will be decisive in determining both their individual political futures and the broader political architecture of Yeouido.

While the first phase of the third force movement has fundamentally failed, the potential for meaningful political transformation remains. Only through strategically sophisticated political leadership combined with efforts calling for structural reforms that amplify smaller parties' voices can this movement hope to create substantive changes in Korea's political landscape.

Park Jin-wan is a nonresident James A. Kelly Korea Fellow at Pacific Forum.