By Lee Seong-hyon
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What is overlooked in the debate is the fact that Seoul and Tokyo feel ambiguous toward each other's strategic values. Both countries see each other as a less important security partner compared to Washington. They also see each other as a less important economic partner compared to Beijing. Prioritizing their relations with Washington for security and Beijing for the economy, and mulling over their own hedging strategy between the two superpowers, Seoul and Tokyo are simply not sure just how important the other side is. Thus, both sides are locked in a wait-and-see mentality of how much damage the other side can tolerate by cold-shouldering each other.
This explains why it is so hard to find diplomatic zeal in Seoul and Tokyo to seek a solution. This underlying psychology persists and dampens political will. Left unattended, the relationship has already been pummeled by hardline voices on both sides.
In fact, relational defeatism is so great that even an argument such as "only time will solve the problem" is suggested as a solution. The danger of this logic is that both sides can settle for a strategy of waiting for the other side to concede first. There is no reason to believe that time will run its healing course and salvage the relationship, which is at its lowest since the two countries normalized relations in 1965. The relationship will drift further apart without active intervention. But how?
The current deadlock between Japan and South Korea should be approached from multiple tracks. However, it should be also acknowledged that the most effective solution would be for the initiative to come from the United States. As the treaty ally of both Asian countries, Washington should be more actively engaged in fostering the Seoul-Tokyo relationship.
Former U.S. President Barack Obama's hosting of a meeting between Shinzo Abe and his then Korean counterpart Park Geun-hye in 2014, in The Hague was a stellar case in point. The clever arrangement was a product of three months of intense behind-the-scenes American diplomacy. The culturally smart diplomatic move was well appreciated by opinion circles in both Seoul and Tokyo.
"The diplomacy of northeast Asia is a little like junior prom: Cathy won't sit with Jamie, but maybe she would if Sally comes over and sits with them," Michael Green, a former director for Asian affairs at the White House with responsibility covering Japan and Korea, deftly observed. And it gives a glimmer of hope that the estranged Asian neighbors can surprisingly be forthcoming when they are assured that they can "save face," by maintaining the facade that they do a certain act because they are cordially invited to do so.
For instance, Park Geun-hye did not intentionally plan to adopt a manifestly hardline posture with Japan in the manner we now know. As a matter of fact, she was keen to improve relations with Japan after she was sworn in at the outset of her presidency, especially because her predecessor Lee Myung-bak had turbulent ties with Japan and she could "correct" it.
"She was waiting for a cue from the Japanese side that she could act along to improve ties," a former senior aide to Park told me. Apparently, it didn't materialize. Rather, the situation got worse with Abe's visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in the same year Park was sworn in. The episode highlights the importance of sending clear messages and showing clearer intentions.
There are many challenges, especially in the short- and medium―term as emotions remain high on both sides, in particular in public opinion. Political elites on both sides will be tempted to exploit it, instead of calming it down.
Against the backdrop, a constructive intervention by Washington stands to play a vital role in managing the regional relationship and promoting dialogue between Tokyo and Seoul.
In its endeavor, Washington has to intervene "visibly," not behind the scenes, to send an unambiguous signal that the improvement in South Korea-Japan relations is in line with the strategic interests of the United States. In other words, it should publicly demonstrate that it is committed to advancing relations between the America's allies while taking significant diplomatic risks.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.