US-South Korea nuclear agreement and its impact on the Korean Peninsula

By Simon Hutagalung

The possibility of a nuclear attack by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as well as his promise to "exponentially" grow his nation's nuclear arsenal have recently alarmed South Koreans. South Korea may create its own nuclear arsenal or ask for the transfer of American tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, according to President Yoon Suk Yeol's remarks in January. If the Yoon and Joe Biden administrations committed to building on the initial agreement that forms the cornerstone of U.S.-South Korean nuclear cooperation, it would be more effective in thwarting Pyongyang's attempts to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul.

Yoon's remarks have raised questions about whether South Korea may independently achieve nuclear weapons capabilities. South Korean and American specialists have pushed the government to back South Korea's attempts to attain nuclear parity with the North despite considerable opposition from American nonproliferation experts. The United States and South Korea have up to this time maintained their formal alignment on nuclear strategy, despite Pyongyang's long-standing efforts to break the alliance and wean South Korea off of its need for American security.

Pyongyang is fully aware of the challenges and costs South Korea may encounter if it took this course. North Korea is well aware of the possible financial costs that South Korea might incur if it broke the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and acquired nuclear weapons; doing so would put South Korea at odds with the rest of the world and pose a serious threat to its export-based economy. If South Korea were to experience the same type of crippling international sanctions that the North experiences, North Korean officials could decide that South Korea's economic advantages over the North would be reduced.

Equally heated is the disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea regarding the reinstatement of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. From the late 1950s until the end of the Cold War, the U.S. maintained tactical nuclear weapons in Europe permanently. The storage facilities and arsenal are not yet prepared for redeployment. No matter where they were stored or utilized, according to American nonproliferation specialists, the United States would not "share" its nuclear weapons with South Korea.

The placement of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea would offer North Korea access to a brand-new valuable target, they note. Despite these challenges, beginning bilateral discussions on the redeploying of American tactical nuclear weapons was advised in a recent report on extended deterrence from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. However, some South Koreans might view this possibility as a poor hand-aid that would give North Korean strategists a tool to foster even more animosity between the United States and South Korea.

The nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and South Korea, as amended in 1974 and 2015, provides the two countries with a framework on which to advance the spread of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This will help make the benefits of the alliance partnership clearer to South Koreans. Nuclear energy provides around 12 percent of South Korea's energy requirements. After nearly finalizing $20 billion in nuclear development contracts with the United Arab Emirates, the Yoon administration wants to build more domestic reactors so that nuclear energy may meet 30 percent of South Korea's energy needs by 2030. Additionally, it is bidding for contracts to build nuclear power plants abroad in Poland, the Czech Republic, Turkey and Egypt.

An enlarged agreement would be extremely beneficial for both South Korea's and the United States' nuclear energy businesses, and they may work together to construct civilian nuclear reactors abroad, aiding other nations in diversifying their energy supplies and cutting carbon emissions. By stepping up bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, South Korea would become more cognizant of the real economic gains that come from working with the United States as well as the costs associated with abandoning the global nonproliferation framework. By emphasizing the costs South Korea would incur if it chose to pursue weapons development instead, this strategy would reinforce the fundamentals of the two nations' peaceful nuclear cooperation. To be ready for any potential nuclear use by North Korea, Washington and Seoul must cooperate more closely, whether the target is San Francisco or Seoul. The collaborative Tailored Deterrence Strategy, which included actions to stop North Korea from deploying nuclear weapons, was altered by the Barack Obama administration.

Regular tabletop exercises on how to react to North Korean tactical nuclear use are an important first step. Washington and Seoul agreed to conduct such exercises, which usually include evaluating their capacity for cooperation to prepare for and respond to a simulated invasion, at their November 2022 Security Consultative Meeting. It is now possible for South Korea and the United States to mount a potent retaliation to North Korea's provocations due to the expansion of nuclear energy ties and increased cooperation on how to deal with nuclear threats. It might show how the alliance between Washington and Seoul is resistant to such nuclear brinksmanship.

Simon Hutagalung is a graduate of the City University of New York and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics. Presently he is working at the Indonesian foreign ministry. The opinions expressed are his own and do not represent the views of CUNY or the Indonesian foreign ministry.