N. Korea and 2-track diplomacy

By Bernard Rowan

South Korea and the United States face conflicting pressures in dealing with North Korea. The South would like to respond to conciliatory gestures and rhetoric by Pyongyang and Kim Jong-un, and perhaps resume Mount Geumgang tours or ease sanctions on the North.

Given the era following the Korean War, staving off impatience should be an easy task. But it seems occasionally difficult ― perhaps like now. South Koreans rightly want progress with the North. For over 60 plus years, the North refuses to recognize the South properly. We must discount partisan politics and emotional incentives in the South. Both Kim and Park have signaled lukewarm willingness in their presidential rhetoric. I say, "Beware Pyongyang's purposes!" Others say we should not let the diplomatic opening disappear.

I don't think the opening is genuine or likely to last. Diplomatic moments have a notoriously short shelf life with Pyongyang. This is because the North uses diplomacy as a tactic. The North confuses the ends and means of foreign policy all the time.

Americans point fingers of blame at Pyongyang for the recent Sony hacking incident, and likely others incidents less well-known. President Barack Obama won't agree to Kim's too-quick and unconvincing New Year's call for diplomacy. For 24 hours, the media featured stories about Kim's speech, but they didn't pass any trust litmus test. Alongside recent anti-American diatribes, insulting the president, and similar petulance, Kim convinced no one but those he can kill anyway.

Koreans and Americans should remember that we share the same ends. This interest grounds Asian regional stability. Both our countries want a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. We sacrifice to keep developing democracies. We invest and keep military assets to deter North Korean irrational ambitions. We cooperate to face down threats to a thriving Northeast Asia Pacific region now and in the future. We promote regional peace and global security with these policies.

The ROK-US alliance is not without flash points. However, these key interests united our governments and peoples. Japan and China should share this agenda. Russian instability makes me hesitant to add that country's name to the list, but such likely will remain a short-term problem until the Russian people sober up.

Our two governments might entertain a two-track approach. To oversimplify, the South could focus, as it has in the past, on the "soft power" issues, making incremental gains in economic development, cultural exchange and inter-Korean dispute resolution. The Americans and other allies could focus on "hard power" issues such as nuclear disarmament, cyber terror, international sanctions and the like. But this dichotomy isn't complete. Policy coordination is critical too. The U.S. and South Korea also must continue to work through various issues related to our alliance and the status of forces on the peninsula as part of South Korea assuming greater control.

This approach might garner some added energy on the diplomatic front. It more likely would unravel once Pyongyang senses it's not gaining anything. I can't imagine any other result.

Let's not forget our "intelligence" about the North. What does Pyongyang want? It wants to stabilize Kim Jong-un's regime. It must not lose face in foreign affairs. It desperately wants access to regional and international markets and credit. It struggles to preserve its military spirit and deterrent posture. It tries to gain a more favorable international reputation and reception. It pretends to predominate any future unification scenario. Finally, Pyongyang wants to create conflict in the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Unfortunately, while still a child-leader, Kim has burned too many bridges. He's alienated most whose cooperation he seeks. No amount of media manipulation will obscure this context absent fundamental changes of behavior unlikely to occur. He's lost too much favor with China. I don't think anyone knows how solid the Pyongyang regime is, but the North's behavior suggests instability and confusion. Of course he courts many anti-status quo powers, but that gang lacks justice and stability itself. His nation's culture is on the wrong side of any balance of forces in economic and political terms. Backwaters can't hope to continue.

In sum, for this brief discussion, Kim's regime, economy and political as well as military ambitions remain unfavorable. But we should work to put this wounded tiger to sleep. What do I mean?

The greatest point of two-track diplomacy should remain deterrence. The standoffish tenor of allied actions should remain. Limit and target soft power overtures; doubt makes "this for that" the rational choice. Base all other policies on a clear, consistent and unified zero-tolerance policy to military provocations and related acts.

It's too soon for a grand summit. Kim Jong-un has done nothing to show a fundamental wish for peace. This stance discomforts friends of unification and many people in the South. But there's not a better way forward, and I would argue any fuller use of two-track diplomacy could only be worse.

Bernard Rowan is assistant provost for curriculum and assessment, professor of political science and faculty athletics representative at Chicago State University, where he has served for 21 years. Write him at browan10@yahoo.com.