A lesson for Xi

By Deauwand Myers

Russian President Vladimir Putin thought his modernized military would make quick work of Ukraine, since Russia has better military technology and more troops at its disposal than its smaller neighbor. He thought he could topple the democratically-elected Ukrainian government and install a puppet regime loyal to the Kremlin.

Finally, Putin believed that NATO and the West in general would be in disarray, too afraid to speak in one voice and unwilling to apply maximalist pressure on Russia, mainly diplomatic isolation and painful economic sanctions.

On every single calculation, Putin was emphatically wrong. The Russian national security apparatus, and indeed vaunted Russian intelligence, were woefully misinformed, and the beating Russian forces are receiving exposes surprising weaknesses in senior leadership.

Which begs another question: if Russia is being defeated through conventional and asymmetric means by a much smaller, weaker military like that of Ukraine, how much worse would Russia perform against a superpower like America or China?

Speaking of China, Chinese President Xi Jinping is a lot like Putin. They both were betrayed by their communist governments.

They both use the state's vast reach to quell political dissent, through violence or the threat of violence (though by any measure, Putin deploys outright murder in ways Xi, as of yet, does not. Xi prefers imprisonment and "re-education").

They both believe their respective countries were brutalized and humiliated by poor leadership at home and the West's interference. Most fundamentally, besides their mutual disdain for democracy and the West, they seek the return of a paternalistic fantasy from a bygone, glorious past, where Russia was the Soviet Union and where China was arguably the center of the civilized world.

Like Putin, Xi has made strides in consolidating political power (in Xi's case, through jailing perceived political rivals, violent imprisonment and cultural genocide of the Chinese Muslim minority population in China's northwest, granular control of Chinese citizens in their daily lives through a massive, dystopian, state surveillance apparatus, and most obviously, in both men's cases, abolishing term limits of the presidency itself).

China has conjured man-made islands along the South China Sea, illegally of course, and just like any authoritarian regime, lied, in this case about never militarizing said islands, which China did in short order nonetheless.

But Xi, ruthless as he is, doesn't have the same level of disregard for human life Putin so readily displays, nor would Xi like to stomach seeing countless numbers of his countrymen and women die in a needless war. As much as Xi demands unification with Taiwan, the democratic island nation is far more prepared for a conflict with its huge neighbor in ways Ukraine was not.

Taiwan has an advanced military. Taiwan has diplomatic and military relations with America. Japan, with one of the best navies on earth, has unofficially pledged to intervene should China decide to take Taiwan by force. Further, China suffers the same problems Russian forces have. Though recently modernized, neither military has had a sustained conflict by which to practice and hone their skills and integrate control and command like America has. The result for Russia is a humiliating, slow-burning defeat for the whole world to see.

Moreover, the Taiwanese, particularly younger generations, despise the idea of becoming part of China. The brutal Chinese crackdown of recently-returned Hong Kong is just one of many reasons the vast majority of Taiwanese would never submit to Chinese rule.

And consider, Xi, and China more broadly, want the aura of legitimacy by the international community. Putin suffers no such affliction and cares much less about the general welfare of the population than Xi.

Xi sees the consequences of warring with a determined foe in blood and treasure and international standing. The diplomatic, economic, and military costs of unilaterally invading a sovereign country, as seen in the case of Russia, would be exceedingly high.

The decoupling of world markets arguably began because of COVID-19. Russia's conflict with Ukraine is accelerating that process. Imagine what the world's response would be if China invaded Taiwan: catastrophic, for all parties, but particularly China.

There are many countries making all the things we like besides China and if world markets cut off China from commerce, trade, and banking, the Chinese Communist Party could very well cease to be. Xi is more pragmatic than Putin. For all his bluster, I don't see Xi invading Taiwan in an unprecedented third term of his presidency.

There are always lessons to be learned in failure. (Mr. Putin must be very wise by now). Xi sees how Russia has fared thus far in Putin's bloody war of choice, and he doesn't want his legacy to be tarnished with the damage or destruction of his party or his policies just for nationalistic ego. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a lesson for Xi, one he most likely will absorb.

Deauwand Myers (deauwand@hotmail.com) holds a master's degree in English literature and literary theory, and is an English professor outside of Seoul.