By John Burton
When Korean President Moon Jae-in met U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington two weeks ago, the bar had been set so low by the media that anything short of the two leaders getting into a screaming match would have been counted as a success.
In truth, the chances of a confrontation over how to deal with North Korea were minimal. Moon had studied his counterpart and knew that he would have to be accommodating and appeal to Trump's oversized ego. The Korean president was successful in setting the mood as soon as he landed in Washington.
Moon visited the National Museum of the Marine Corps to commemorate the Hungnam evacuation that rescued his parents fleeing North Korea in 1950 as well as the Korean War Veterans Memorial. He brought along more than 50 Korean executives who promised a total of $45 billion to invest in the U.S. or buy American products.
Moon's deft diplomacy seemed to work, with the two countries appearing to bridge their differences on North Korea policy. This interpretation was largely based on the joint statement that was issued. It appeared to reconcile Trump's preference for tough sanctions on North Korea and Moon's approach of offering carrots to Pyongyang in the form of talks, humanitarian aid and economic cooperation.
Under any other U.S. administration, the language contained in the joint statement, stating that Seoul would take the lead on dialogue with Pyongyang, would have been considered a victory for Moon.
But the statement carefully drawn up by the U.S. and Korean foreign ministers is in danger of becoming just a scrap of paper in the age of Trump, whose unorthodox behavior can quickly render any apparent agreement obsolete.
Indeed, there were plenty of danger signs displayed at the summit. While the Korean delegation was focused on a strategy to achieve coordination with U.S. on North Korea, Trump suddenly brought up the renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Indeed the U.S. president spent as much time in public comments with Moon on trade than he did on North Korea, although there was no reference to the FTA in the joint statement.
Although Trump had previously criticized the FTA, his emphasis on the issue during the summit indicates that trade probably lies closest to his heart and confirms that he is deep-dyed economic nationalist. What also surprised observers in Washington that most had expected that an attempt to renegotiate the KORUS FTA would not be made until 2018 at the earliest.
Trump's stance on trade indicates there could be a rocky road ahead in relations between Seoul and Washington. A lot will depend on how Trump wants to revise the FTA and whether he would be satisfied with concessions such as easier entry to U.S. car imports and the increased purchase of U.S. energy supplies, such as natural gas, or push for a complete revision.
A dispute on trade is likely to further erode what little support Trump has in Korea. Koreans have the lowest confidence rating in Trump among Asians at just 17%, according to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center.
How to deal with North Korea will remain the central issue in the bilateral relationship. Moon appeared to endorse a more hardline policy in line with Washington. He expressed support for the Trump administration's policy of "maximum pressure and engagement," while Seoul agreed"to fully implement existing sanctions and impose new measures" with the U.S.
Moreover, any attempt by the Moon administration to promote economic cooperation with North Korea could now run into resistance by the Trump administration. Seoul would hesitate in setting up any projects with North Korea, such as reviving the Kaesong Industrial Complex, without seeking approval of the U.S. Otherwise, it could face the same type of secondary sanctions that the Trump administration has imposed on several Chinese entities doing business with Pyongyang.
Trump has used has the trade issue as a way to boxed in the Moon administration on its North Korean policy. In criticizing Korean trade policy, Trump has implied that Seoul should fall into line with a more aggressive U.S. stance on North Korea if it wants to avoid problems exporting products to the U.S. In an example of his transactional Art of the Deal, Trump appears to be pursuing a strategy of willing to ease pressure on renegotiating the FTA if Seoul plays ball on North Korea.
That poses a big dilemma for Moon. Given the importance of economic ties with the U.S., Moon may have no choice but to decide that trade should take precedence over his North Korean policy of engagement. This is particularly true when there is little evidence that Korea's large trade surplus with the U.S. is about to disappear.
John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington,. D.C.-based journalist and consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.
.jpg/dims/resize/740/optimize) |
In truth, the chances of a confrontation over how to deal with North Korea were minimal. Moon had studied his counterpart and knew that he would have to be accommodating and appeal to Trump's oversized ego. The Korean president was successful in setting the mood as soon as he landed in Washington.
Moon visited the National Museum of the Marine Corps to commemorate the Hungnam evacuation that rescued his parents fleeing North Korea in 1950 as well as the Korean War Veterans Memorial. He brought along more than 50 Korean executives who promised a total of $45 billion to invest in the U.S. or buy American products.
Moon's deft diplomacy seemed to work, with the two countries appearing to bridge their differences on North Korea policy. This interpretation was largely based on the joint statement that was issued. It appeared to reconcile Trump's preference for tough sanctions on North Korea and Moon's approach of offering carrots to Pyongyang in the form of talks, humanitarian aid and economic cooperation.
Under any other U.S. administration, the language contained in the joint statement, stating that Seoul would take the lead on dialogue with Pyongyang, would have been considered a victory for Moon.
But the statement carefully drawn up by the U.S. and Korean foreign ministers is in danger of becoming just a scrap of paper in the age of Trump, whose unorthodox behavior can quickly render any apparent agreement obsolete.
Indeed, there were plenty of danger signs displayed at the summit. While the Korean delegation was focused on a strategy to achieve coordination with U.S. on North Korea, Trump suddenly brought up the renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Indeed the U.S. president spent as much time in public comments with Moon on trade than he did on North Korea, although there was no reference to the FTA in the joint statement.
Although Trump had previously criticized the FTA, his emphasis on the issue during the summit indicates that trade probably lies closest to his heart and confirms that he is deep-dyed economic nationalist. What also surprised observers in Washington that most had expected that an attempt to renegotiate the KORUS FTA would not be made until 2018 at the earliest.
Trump's stance on trade indicates there could be a rocky road ahead in relations between Seoul and Washington. A lot will depend on how Trump wants to revise the FTA and whether he would be satisfied with concessions such as easier entry to U.S. car imports and the increased purchase of U.S. energy supplies, such as natural gas, or push for a complete revision.
A dispute on trade is likely to further erode what little support Trump has in Korea. Koreans have the lowest confidence rating in Trump among Asians at just 17%, according to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center.
How to deal with North Korea will remain the central issue in the bilateral relationship. Moon appeared to endorse a more hardline policy in line with Washington. He expressed support for the Trump administration's policy of "maximum pressure and engagement," while Seoul agreed"to fully implement existing sanctions and impose new measures" with the U.S.
Moreover, any attempt by the Moon administration to promote economic cooperation with North Korea could now run into resistance by the Trump administration. Seoul would hesitate in setting up any projects with North Korea, such as reviving the Kaesong Industrial Complex, without seeking approval of the U.S. Otherwise, it could face the same type of secondary sanctions that the Trump administration has imposed on several Chinese entities doing business with Pyongyang.
Trump has used has the trade issue as a way to boxed in the Moon administration on its North Korean policy. In criticizing Korean trade policy, Trump has implied that Seoul should fall into line with a more aggressive U.S. stance on North Korea if it wants to avoid problems exporting products to the U.S. In an example of his transactional Art of the Deal, Trump appears to be pursuing a strategy of willing to ease pressure on renegotiating the FTA if Seoul plays ball on North Korea.
That poses a big dilemma for Moon. Given the importance of economic ties with the U.S., Moon may have no choice but to decide that trade should take precedence over his North Korean policy of engagement. This is particularly true when there is little evidence that Korea's large trade surplus with the U.S. is about to disappear.
John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington,. D.C.-based journalist and consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.
![[INTERVIEW] Can art become stable investment source?](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/d9b4b117e5b74f4c931de724ebd2ee68.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] Choi Min-sik, Lee Dong-hwi on creating Korean-style noir with 'Big Bet'](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/8b795a8f6b42492db4e8fdc47e9abd8d.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] Ahn Jae-hong on playing underdog basketball coach in 'Rebound'](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/fe381342632c46bfa6d3245cb475676e.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
