Lessons of Euromissile crisis

By John Burton

In the early 1980s, Western Europe was engulfed in a political crisis over the U.S. deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles to counter a move by the Soviet Union to base SS-20 theater ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe.

I'm reminded of the lessons that event, known as the Euromissile crisis, holds as South Korea confronts China's opposition over the planned deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system to counter North Korea's nuclear program.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter initially proposed in 1979 to deploy the U.S. missiles in West Germany and several other NATO allied countries if the Russians refused to negotiate the withdrawal of their SS-20s, which could reach their targets within minutes. He had the backing of the West German socialist chancellor Helmut Schmidt despite Bonn's policy of seeking better ties with Moscow.

But there was mounting public opposition to the plan, particularly after Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter as president in 1981. Soviet propagandists played on fears in Western Europe that the U.S. was embarking on an aggressive military strategy under "Cowboy Reagan" that would plunge the world into a nuclear war. Moscow hoped to play on these fears to divide the NATO alliance.

The public uproar reached its height in 1983 after NATO formally confirmed that it would base cruise missiles in the U.K. and Italy and Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany. Widespread public protests were organized and convulsed these countries for several months.But in November 1983, the West German parliament approved the deployment and the Pershing missiles arrived soon afterwards.

In early 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to negotiate the withdrawal of the SS-20s in return for the U.S. doing the same with its missiles, with a final agreement reached in 1987. The crisis was over.

Seoul must heed these lessons and proceed with THAAD. There is little doubt that North Korea is ramping up its missile development, including not only intermediate range ballistic missiles but also submarine launched ones. THAAD should be seen as a rational response to the North's intentions.

Although THAAD would be considered a defensive system (unlike the Pershing II missiles that were deployed in West Germany), China has objected because it believes the range of the THAAD radars and interceptor missiles could be used to help plot and destroy Chinese missiles once they are launched and undermine Beijing's nuclear deterrent.

China sees the current debate in South Korea as an opportunity to split the defense alliance between Washington and Seoul just as Moscow once tried to do with NATO's missile deployment.

Indeed, Beijing appears to be using the same playbook that Moscow followed in dealing the Pershing II missile deployment. Beijing is warning that South Korea could become a prime target for military strikes if war ever erupted between China and the U.S. Moscow made similar threats in trying to block the Pershing II missiles.

China is also trying to stir up public opinion in South Korea against THAAD by welcoming several visiting opposition lawmakers. It also appears to have embarked on a plan to curb Korean business activities in China, including the supply of batteries to local electric vehicle makers and visits by K-pop stars, in retaliation for Seoul's decision.

China has consistently urged that negotiations are the only way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. So perhaps the U.S. should borrow the "carrots and sticks" approach it used in the lead-up to the deployment of the Pershing II missiles.

When it announced the Euromissile plan in 1979, the U.S. said it would pursue a "dual track" strategy to first negotiate with the Soviet Union to withdraw the SS-20s by a certain deadline before it began its own missile deployment. The talks lasted from 1981 to 1983, but came to no conclusion.

Washington could offer Beijing to halt the THAAD deployment if China showed that it is aggressively applying sanctions to pressure North Korea to stop its nuclear weapons and missile program. This would include China strictly prohibiting the supply of rocket fuel or chemicals used in fuel production to North Korea as required under the U.N. sanctions resolution. The U.S. might also signal its readiness to begin talks with North Korea, but stipulate a deadline for Pyongyang to end its nuclear ambitions.

If North Korea continues to aggressively pursue its nuclear and missile program, the U.S. should demand that China step up economic pressure by briefly closing, for example, all its land and sea borders to stop trade with North Korea in a warning sign that Beijing is serious about imposing its will.

But if China chooses instead to wield its economic leverage against South Korea rather than North Korea, the U.S. is perfectly justified in proceeding with THAAD.

John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Seoul-based independent journalist and media consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.atimes.co.kr.