By Tom Coyner
Following last Saturday's Itaewon tragedy, the predictable sessions of finger-pointing have begun among politicians, bureaucrats and the public.?While there is ample blame to be shared, it is better to draw practical lessons from the crowd disaster, so events like this may not happen again.
Here are a few points I have gleaned since Sunday morning:
First, young Koreans have become too complacent in subjecting themselves to dangerously crowded environments. Nightclubs often allow too many guests in too narrow of quarters. Korean fire marshals or their equivalent need to be given greater authority to monitor, manage and cancel events ― indoors or outdoors.
Second, a generation gap between partygoers and government authorities may have played a role. A chauvinism by authorities towards very young adults resulted in a callous disregard for people in their late teens and 20s allowing them to engage in dangerous group behavior that would not likely be tolerated of older citizens. The younger generations have different values and unsurprisingly act peculiar by older people's standards. But that is not enough reason to treat them differently when safety controls are needed. The authorities need to study this unfortunate case seriously and reflect on their attitudes to all demographics.
Third, new ordinances regarding public sound levels need to be created ― and enforced. Various accounts complained how difficult it was to follow directions with music blaring from several directions while the incident took place.
Fourth, the police need to do more than simply study crowd control. They need to train beforehand. During Sunday evening, very good counterexamples were shown on television as to how the Japanese police controlled thousands of partygoers at Tokyo's famous Shibuya crossroads. True, the streets and alleys in Japan are wider than in Itaewon, but clearly the Japanese police were in full command of the situation.
Fifth, the current alibis by the government, including that of Arirang Television's editor-in-chief denying government negligence during her BBC interview, need to be refuted. Yes, the government could have done a better job with more police. But an extra 200 police to address a mob of 100,000? Give me a break. Some rumors suggest that the 200 were from the narcotics division rather than trained in crowd control. ?
And the discussions go downhill from there.
No doubt many of the criticisms are politically motivated, but whatever the reasons, there were clearly many more police monitoring the well-orchestrated political demonstrations taking place concurrently in Gwanghwamun than the anticipated mega mob in Itaewon. There was a lack of on-site emergency vehicles?at the ready beyond the Itaewon Fire Department. When emergency response vehicles arrived, illegally parked cars in addition to thousands of dazed young people blocked their path. At least during times of special celebration, parking regulations need to be vigorously enforced, including towing vehicles parked illegally.
Finally, once the hubris has cleared, there needs to be a full review about the deployment of crowd control police. There are allegations that the so-called riot cops are allocated on a district-by-district basis, and there had not been adequate reallocation of such personnel after the presidential office and residence were relocated from Jongno District to Yongsan District. But that was not the case, since there are two units assigned to presidential protection, separate from the Jongno and Yongsan police forces. In any event, crowd control personnel, for whatever reason, were not properly allocated.
There needs to be a serious review of the command and control function for the entire presidential office for major social and political events' safety. That includes dealing with large crowds lacking any formal organizations with which the police may coordinate. There were large police deployments to the concurrent political demonstrations in Gwanghwamun that were coordinated by formal organizations. But Itaewon was an anticipated mob lacking any coordinated response.
Looking at the total, I reflected how if stuck in a foxhole during a battle, my first choice of comrades would be Koreans given their tactical skills in quickly assessing and taking remedial actions. On the other hand, my last choice for my general would be a Korean.
Similar to the 2014 Sewol ferry tragedy, major changes will no doubt follow to address mistakes and flaws. But why must we wait to make changes when we can see major errors of tragic proportions waiting for the next disaster to take place?
Tom Coyner (tom@softlandingkorea.com) is president of Soft Landing Consulting in Seoul.
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Here are a few points I have gleaned since Sunday morning:
First, young Koreans have become too complacent in subjecting themselves to dangerously crowded environments. Nightclubs often allow too many guests in too narrow of quarters. Korean fire marshals or their equivalent need to be given greater authority to monitor, manage and cancel events ― indoors or outdoors.
Second, a generation gap between partygoers and government authorities may have played a role. A chauvinism by authorities towards very young adults resulted in a callous disregard for people in their late teens and 20s allowing them to engage in dangerous group behavior that would not likely be tolerated of older citizens. The younger generations have different values and unsurprisingly act peculiar by older people's standards. But that is not enough reason to treat them differently when safety controls are needed. The authorities need to study this unfortunate case seriously and reflect on their attitudes to all demographics.
Third, new ordinances regarding public sound levels need to be created ― and enforced. Various accounts complained how difficult it was to follow directions with music blaring from several directions while the incident took place.
Fourth, the police need to do more than simply study crowd control. They need to train beforehand. During Sunday evening, very good counterexamples were shown on television as to how the Japanese police controlled thousands of partygoers at Tokyo's famous Shibuya crossroads. True, the streets and alleys in Japan are wider than in Itaewon, but clearly the Japanese police were in full command of the situation.
Fifth, the current alibis by the government, including that of Arirang Television's editor-in-chief denying government negligence during her BBC interview, need to be refuted. Yes, the government could have done a better job with more police. But an extra 200 police to address a mob of 100,000? Give me a break. Some rumors suggest that the 200 were from the narcotics division rather than trained in crowd control. ?
And the discussions go downhill from there.
No doubt many of the criticisms are politically motivated, but whatever the reasons, there were clearly many more police monitoring the well-orchestrated political demonstrations taking place concurrently in Gwanghwamun than the anticipated mega mob in Itaewon. There was a lack of on-site emergency vehicles?at the ready beyond the Itaewon Fire Department. When emergency response vehicles arrived, illegally parked cars in addition to thousands of dazed young people blocked their path. At least during times of special celebration, parking regulations need to be vigorously enforced, including towing vehicles parked illegally.
Finally, once the hubris has cleared, there needs to be a full review about the deployment of crowd control police. There are allegations that the so-called riot cops are allocated on a district-by-district basis, and there had not been adequate reallocation of such personnel after the presidential office and residence were relocated from Jongno District to Yongsan District. But that was not the case, since there are two units assigned to presidential protection, separate from the Jongno and Yongsan police forces. In any event, crowd control personnel, for whatever reason, were not properly allocated.
There needs to be a serious review of the command and control function for the entire presidential office for major social and political events' safety. That includes dealing with large crowds lacking any formal organizations with which the police may coordinate. There were large police deployments to the concurrent political demonstrations in Gwanghwamun that were coordinated by formal organizations. But Itaewon was an anticipated mob lacking any coordinated response.
Looking at the total, I reflected how if stuck in a foxhole during a battle, my first choice of comrades would be Koreans given their tactical skills in quickly assessing and taking remedial actions. On the other hand, my last choice for my general would be a Korean.
Similar to the 2014 Sewol ferry tragedy, major changes will no doubt follow to address mistakes and flaws. But why must we wait to make changes when we can see major errors of tragic proportions waiting for the next disaster to take place?
Tom Coyner (tom@softlandingkorea.com) is president of Soft Landing Consulting in Seoul.
