By Lee Seong-hyon
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After the collapse of the Hanoi summit, Kim retreated to his cave and had a long reflection: What had gone wrong? It's his known habit. When he was studying in Switzerland in his teens, he used to hold review sessions with his basketball buddies, after losing a game.
Since Kim's "nuclear button" match with Trump to this year's Hanoi summit that spectacularly collapsed, there has been one fundamental key question that has not been answered: Whether or not North Korea will denuclearize?
There is only one person in the world who knows the answer: Kim himself. And Kim has to wrestle with this question in his cave, based on his perception of the world.
To be fair to Kim, he has reportedly made numerous expressions of such intent to world leaders such as Moon Jae-in, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. When he was asked by a reporter during the Hanoi summit whether he was serious about denuclearization, Kim also said publicly: "I wouldn't have come here if I didn't have the willingness to denuclearize."
However, to be also fair, it is also reality on the ground that many, if not most, members of the Washington policy community, doubt Kim's words. Some think Kim is trying to buy time, while making cosmetic denuclearization gestures. Others think Kim's game is similar to Pakistan ― to persist in holding on to nukes while making the denuclearization rhetoric window dressing.
If Kim is thinking in this way, or if Kim's aides are advising him to adopt this strategy, this appears to be a smart move on the surface, but essentially a self-defeating game in the end.
Smart, because if one browses through the Foreign Affairs magazine, published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), they could see that surprisingly many established scholars suggest that the North Korea nuclear issue cannot be solved, but only managed. Their logic goes that North Korea will not abandon nuclear weapons, and forcing it to do so with kinetic options is too risky, and therefore we should approach it with management, not a solution. The North Koreans must have researched this trend of strategic thinking and may be calculating that time is on their side, as long as they persist.
If Kim is toying with this strategy, that is likely to be a self-defeating choice. It's because since the Hanoi meet up, the Trump administration has been adhering to an expedient "grand bargain" solution mechanism of North Korea renouncing its nuclear weapons in exchange for economic sanctions relief. To incentivize North Korea's actions, Washington has been pressing hard with tight sanctions on the North. How long can Pyongyang persist is an open question.
Now, what should Kim's choice be? It's time for Kim to read Plato, read about the caveman. Kim's strategic decision will be influenced by a number of factors, including his perception of the world, his upbringing and education, his nuclear mentors and advisers, as well as his father's words.
Kim's decision (or non-decision) to denuclearize also has to do with how he envisions his country's future. He may be worried about whether he could continue to rule the country after he forgoes nuclear weapons. It is also possible that like his grandfather, he may be seeing nuclear weapons as the most certain deterrence against more powerful, bigger countries that bully North Korea, in his siege mentality of perceiving the world.
It may also have to do with whether he can trust Trump. Trump is a seasoned negotiator. Given what happened to Libya's Gaddafi, what happens to Kim after he disowns nuclear weapons? What if Trump doesn't keep his side of the bargain?
Kim must have thought about all this internally during his one-and-a-half month silent retreat in his strategic cave. It may be possible that Kim himself may still be uncertain about whether he should give up nuclear weapons or not.
For Kim to make the correct strategic decision, he has to clearly and correctly see the world outside. Plato offers a commonsensical solution: one has to leave the cave. In this vein, Kim's expression of willingness to meet with Trump for a third summit is seen as a positive step. The world should lead Kim to come outside the cave as much as possible.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.