By Ted Gover
During President Trump's historic June 30 visit to North Korean soil, it was announced by the White House that talks will begin again within weeks.
Trump's impromptu outreach to Kim Jong-un was a bold effort to restart denuclearization talks that broke off abruptly at the Feb. 27 Hanoi summit.
It may have also been an attempt by Trump to regain any influence lost with Kim to Chinese President Xi Jinping during Xi's June 20-21 state visit to Pyongyang.
Xi's primary reasons for visiting Pyongyang were twofold: 1) for currying favor with Kim to be used as leverage in his trade war with Washington, and 2) reasserting Beijing's influence as a shaper of events on the Korean Peninsula and cementing its role in the North Korea denuclearization discussions.
Despite Trump's energetic outreach to Kim, doubts remain among many as to the efficacy of his weekend diplomacy going forward.
Critics argue that there is no substance to President Trump's personality politics and that his highly publicized overture will fail to persuade Kim to disarm given that nuclear weapons have become a central pillar of the Kim dynasty.
They say that Kim is scheming to yet again dupe the U.S. into thinking that it has given up its nuclear program in exchange for investment and badly needed sanctions relief.
Other detractors of the president lament that Kim was not required to give up anything to meet with Trump, arguing that a prerequisite for a third meeting with a U.S. president ought to have been a shutdown of a handful of the regime's nuclear facilities, such as Yongbyon.
Beyond this, some have expressed regret that Trump reportedly gave away another important bargaining chip by inviting Kim to the White House even though Pyongyang has yet to begin handing over its nuclear weapons or releasing any political prisoners.
Yet, the president should be applauded for his creative efforts to find out if anything can be done to persuade Kim to give up his nuclear weapons short of withdrawing U.S. forces from the region.
It may be that the best Washington will get is a nuclear North Korea that is on speaking terms with the White House ― a low bar although a starting point for improved relations.
Perhaps over time North Korea will emerge that can work with the United States, however limited, on joint endeavors and begin to move away from Beijing's orbit.
Or maybe an agreement can be struck that suspends Kim's nuclear weapons program with inspections in exchange for a mixture of sanctions relief, investment and aid.
Ultimately, the North's regime will need to reform in order for more favorable outcomes to develop. Until then, Washington will need to employ a long-term strategy of containment, sanctions and deterrence to protect the U.S. and regional allies, all while leaving the door open for negotiations.
Ted Gover, Ph.D., writes on foreign policy and is the director of the Tribal Administration Program at Claremont Graduate University. Contact him at amberjack_shoal@yahoo.com.
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Trump's impromptu outreach to Kim Jong-un was a bold effort to restart denuclearization talks that broke off abruptly at the Feb. 27 Hanoi summit.
It may have also been an attempt by Trump to regain any influence lost with Kim to Chinese President Xi Jinping during Xi's June 20-21 state visit to Pyongyang.
Xi's primary reasons for visiting Pyongyang were twofold: 1) for currying favor with Kim to be used as leverage in his trade war with Washington, and 2) reasserting Beijing's influence as a shaper of events on the Korean Peninsula and cementing its role in the North Korea denuclearization discussions.
Despite Trump's energetic outreach to Kim, doubts remain among many as to the efficacy of his weekend diplomacy going forward.
Critics argue that there is no substance to President Trump's personality politics and that his highly publicized overture will fail to persuade Kim to disarm given that nuclear weapons have become a central pillar of the Kim dynasty.
They say that Kim is scheming to yet again dupe the U.S. into thinking that it has given up its nuclear program in exchange for investment and badly needed sanctions relief.
Other detractors of the president lament that Kim was not required to give up anything to meet with Trump, arguing that a prerequisite for a third meeting with a U.S. president ought to have been a shutdown of a handful of the regime's nuclear facilities, such as Yongbyon.
Beyond this, some have expressed regret that Trump reportedly gave away another important bargaining chip by inviting Kim to the White House even though Pyongyang has yet to begin handing over its nuclear weapons or releasing any political prisoners.
Yet, the president should be applauded for his creative efforts to find out if anything can be done to persuade Kim to give up his nuclear weapons short of withdrawing U.S. forces from the region.
It may be that the best Washington will get is a nuclear North Korea that is on speaking terms with the White House ― a low bar although a starting point for improved relations.
Perhaps over time North Korea will emerge that can work with the United States, however limited, on joint endeavors and begin to move away from Beijing's orbit.
Or maybe an agreement can be struck that suspends Kim's nuclear weapons program with inspections in exchange for a mixture of sanctions relief, investment and aid.
Ultimately, the North's regime will need to reform in order for more favorable outcomes to develop. Until then, Washington will need to employ a long-term strategy of containment, sanctions and deterrence to protect the U.S. and regional allies, all while leaving the door open for negotiations.
Ted Gover, Ph.D., writes on foreign policy and is the director of the Tribal Administration Program at Claremont Graduate University. Contact him at amberjack_shoal@yahoo.com.
