By Park Yoon-bae
The May 21 summit between President Moon Jae-in and his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden has set a new stage for the bilateral alliance. It has also significant implications for South Korea's foreign policy amid the escalating Sino-U.S. rivalry.
Moon and Biden have managed to restore their countries' alliance, which had been undermined ― to a certain degree ― by former President Donald Trump's "America first" policy. It is fortunate that the two leaders have agreed to expand the alliance beyond security to investment, technology, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.
Most notable is that President Moon has tilted toward the U.S., shaking off suspicions that he might be trying to maintain a distance from South Korea's traditional ally in a bid to forge closer ties with China. It is interesting to postulate what made Moon change his policy of striking a balance between Washington and Beijing.
The joint statement issued by Moon and Biden at the end of their face-to-face meeting in Washington, D.C., clearly showed that Seoul had tipped the balance in the U.S.'s favor. Moon must have made a practical decision to move closer to America. But why did he do that, despite an anticipated backlash from China?
One of convincing reasons is that he has made concessions to Biden in order to press ahead with his engagement policy toward North Korea and give a boost to his much-touted peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The joint statement provides a clear explanation in this regard.
In the statement, the two presidents stressed their shared commitment to the "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Biden accepted Moon's insistence on the use of the quoted phrase, which appeared in the joint statement issued by Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their first summit in Singapore in 2018, instead of the "complete denuclearization of North Korea."
They have also agreed to address North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs through diplomacy and dialogue based on previous inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration and the Singapore Joint Statement.
The agreement fully reflected Moon's position that the Biden administration should inherit Trump's "achievements" in his top-down negotiations with Kim. Biden had earlier hinted at scrapping his predecessor's North Korea policy as part of his "anything but Trump" mantra. But Moon has succeeded in persuading Biden to pick up where Trump left off as far as the North is concerned.
Moon's efforts to actively engage with North Korea are also likely to regain momentum following the summit. The President has received support from Biden for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement and cooperation. As a result, the Washington meeting has virtually endorsed his ambition to take the driver's seat in establishing a peace process on the peninsula.
In return, President Moon has given Biden what he wanted. He has agreed to support Biden's move to promote a rules-based international order and maintain an inclusive, free and open Indo-Pacific. He acknowledged the importance of open, transparent and inclusive regional multilateralism including the work of the "Quad."
In other words, Moon has virtually supported Biden's policy of forming an anti-China alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. Yet he managed to avoid joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a U.S.-led informal coalition to contain a rising China. Washington apparently sought Seoul's participation in the Quad, but the latter was still reluctant to do so, in order not to anger Beijing.
Nevertheless, Moon has backed the U.S. commitment to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. All these indicate that Moon's foreign policy focus is shifting away from China, and toward the U.S. That's why China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said China would not tolerate any foreign interference on the Taiwan issue, warning "relevant countries not to play with fire."
After the better-than-expected Moon-Biden summit, Seoul must be finding it far more difficult to play a balancing act between Washington and Beijing. South Korea will likely face greater pressure to take part in the Quad, comprised of the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. The country will also face a stronger backlash from China for its closer alliance with the U.S.
In this context, the Moon administration needs to prepare for the worst-case scenario under which Korea is forced to choose sides amid the escalating superpower confrontation. We have to make efforts to avoid any retaliation from Beijing as seen in the dispute over Seoul's decision to allow Washington to deploy a missile defense system, known as THAAD, on our soil in 2017.
Now, policymakers and politicians should overhaul the country's long-held policy of relying on the U.S. for security and depending on China for economic growth. Excessive dependence on a single country for whatever reason is highly dangerous.
More than anything else, Korea desperately needs "creative diplomacy" and a new survival strategy that can go beyond alliances and great power competition. It is time to hammer out comprehensive measures to prevent our country being caught in the crossfire of the ever-fiercer Sino-U.S. conflict.
The author (byb@koreatimes.co.kr) is the chief editorial writer of The Korea Times.
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Moon and Biden have managed to restore their countries' alliance, which had been undermined ― to a certain degree ― by former President Donald Trump's "America first" policy. It is fortunate that the two leaders have agreed to expand the alliance beyond security to investment, technology, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.
Most notable is that President Moon has tilted toward the U.S., shaking off suspicions that he might be trying to maintain a distance from South Korea's traditional ally in a bid to forge closer ties with China. It is interesting to postulate what made Moon change his policy of striking a balance between Washington and Beijing.
The joint statement issued by Moon and Biden at the end of their face-to-face meeting in Washington, D.C., clearly showed that Seoul had tipped the balance in the U.S.'s favor. Moon must have made a practical decision to move closer to America. But why did he do that, despite an anticipated backlash from China?
One of convincing reasons is that he has made concessions to Biden in order to press ahead with his engagement policy toward North Korea and give a boost to his much-touted peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The joint statement provides a clear explanation in this regard.
In the statement, the two presidents stressed their shared commitment to the "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Biden accepted Moon's insistence on the use of the quoted phrase, which appeared in the joint statement issued by Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their first summit in Singapore in 2018, instead of the "complete denuclearization of North Korea."
They have also agreed to address North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs through diplomacy and dialogue based on previous inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration and the Singapore Joint Statement.
The agreement fully reflected Moon's position that the Biden administration should inherit Trump's "achievements" in his top-down negotiations with Kim. Biden had earlier hinted at scrapping his predecessor's North Korea policy as part of his "anything but Trump" mantra. But Moon has succeeded in persuading Biden to pick up where Trump left off as far as the North is concerned.
Moon's efforts to actively engage with North Korea are also likely to regain momentum following the summit. The President has received support from Biden for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement and cooperation. As a result, the Washington meeting has virtually endorsed his ambition to take the driver's seat in establishing a peace process on the peninsula.
In return, President Moon has given Biden what he wanted. He has agreed to support Biden's move to promote a rules-based international order and maintain an inclusive, free and open Indo-Pacific. He acknowledged the importance of open, transparent and inclusive regional multilateralism including the work of the "Quad."
In other words, Moon has virtually supported Biden's policy of forming an anti-China alliance in the Indo-Pacific region. Yet he managed to avoid joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a U.S.-led informal coalition to contain a rising China. Washington apparently sought Seoul's participation in the Quad, but the latter was still reluctant to do so, in order not to anger Beijing.
Nevertheless, Moon has backed the U.S. commitment to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. All these indicate that Moon's foreign policy focus is shifting away from China, and toward the U.S. That's why China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said China would not tolerate any foreign interference on the Taiwan issue, warning "relevant countries not to play with fire."
After the better-than-expected Moon-Biden summit, Seoul must be finding it far more difficult to play a balancing act between Washington and Beijing. South Korea will likely face greater pressure to take part in the Quad, comprised of the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. The country will also face a stronger backlash from China for its closer alliance with the U.S.
In this context, the Moon administration needs to prepare for the worst-case scenario under which Korea is forced to choose sides amid the escalating superpower confrontation. We have to make efforts to avoid any retaliation from Beijing as seen in the dispute over Seoul's decision to allow Washington to deploy a missile defense system, known as THAAD, on our soil in 2017.
Now, policymakers and politicians should overhaul the country's long-held policy of relying on the U.S. for security and depending on China for economic growth. Excessive dependence on a single country for whatever reason is highly dangerous.
More than anything else, Korea desperately needs "creative diplomacy" and a new survival strategy that can go beyond alliances and great power competition. It is time to hammer out comprehensive measures to prevent our country being caught in the crossfire of the ever-fiercer Sino-U.S. conflict.
The author (byb@koreatimes.co.kr) is the chief editorial writer of The Korea Times.
