By Park Yoon-bae
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We Koreans have known relations between Seoul and Washington deteriorated because Carter tried to implement his campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea.
Let's take a brief look at a transcript of an hour-long conversation between Carter and then South Korean President Park Chung-hee during their meeting in Seoul on June 30, 1979.
Last week, Korea's semi-official Yonhap News Agency reported on the content of the transcript found and released by James F. Person, a professor of Korean studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
The transcript confirmed our perception that the two presidents were poles apart over the troop issue, as well as the human rights situation in South Korea then.
"I can't promise that we will freeze forces levels," Carter told Park. And he questioned the South's commitment to a hike in its defense budget to counter the North's rapid military buildup.
But Park made clear his strong opposition to the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), telling Carter U.S. troops should stay for the time being because the North's military was superior to that of the South. He warned of miscalculation on the part of North Korea.
What draws more attention is another White House document detailing Carter's secret drive for a three-way dialogue between the two Koreas and the U.S. to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula, in a bid to create an atmosphere conducive to making good on his troop pullout promise.
From the early months of his tenure in 1977, Carter pushed for such a tripartite session, believing an inter-Korean detente could lay the groundwork for eventual troop withdrawal. He even selected Jakarta, Indonesia, as the venue for the planned meeting of senior officials from the three countries.
The plan was evident in a note his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski sent to then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on Aug. 5, 1977. The note reads: "The President has read your paper concerning possible trilateral discussions between North Korea, South Korea and the United States, and has indicated that you should proceed to implement the suggested steps."
But the dialogue plan fell apart as Pyongyang showed no interest.
Imagine what would have happened if such talks had taken place and Carter had succeeded in withdrawing U.S. troops from the South, or at least cutting back their numbers. It is, of course, meaningless to dwell too much on such a historical "what if."
Yet Carter's troop pullout drive and his human rights diplomacy might have affected the downfall of the dictatorial Park regime one way or another.
Park, a general-turned-dictator, seized power by staging a military coup on May 16, 1961. After that, the strongman tightened his grip on power with the ambition to become president-for-life.
But about four months after meeting Carter, Park was assassinated by Kim Jae-gyu, then director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.
There was speculation that Park pressed ahead with a secret program to develop nuclear weapons in preparation for a potential withdrawal of U.S. troops.
As he told Carter, Park was well aware the USFK could not stay in Korea forever. This might have allegedly made Park consider a clandestine nuclear program.
Now, we Koreans need to think about what role the USFK should play, particularly in case the two Koreas and the U.S. ― and possibly with China ― sign a peace treaty after the North dismantles its nuclear arsenal as promised by its leader Kim Jong-un.
Some critics argue the U.S. would never remove its forces from the South, to protect its own geopolitical and security interests in the region. They also say the U.S. wants its military presence here more than the host country does.
It is true that Washington is using its Asian ally as a strategic outpost to contain a rising China, although President Donald Trump once called South Korea a "free rider" in the bilateral defense alliance. (Actually, South Korea is not a free rider as it shares the cost of stationing 28,000 U.S. troops here. Currently Seoul pays 960 billion won ($850 million), or about half the total cost.)
Yet no one can rule out the possibility of a USFK pullout when a lasting peace regime is in place on the peninsula, or when South Korea loses its strategic value. And if we can afford to maintain peace on our own, we have no reason to host foreign troops on our soil.
Park Yoon-bae (byb@koreatimes.co.kr) is the chief editorial writer of The Korea Times.
