2022: Year of living dangerously

By Yun Byung-se

Predictions are galore as to how the New Year of the Tiger will unfold. Uncertain, turbulent and contested are popular adjectives describing the world before us where worries overshadow hopes. The main sources of such apprehensions are systemic, structural and deep-rooted, while others are transitional or cyclical.

At the global level, there is a broad consensus that U.S.-China strategic competition will intensify and that climate change will accelerate. If the former can rock the grand geo-economic and geopolitical chessboards in the coming decades, the latter is destined to exacerbate human living conditions on this planet.

Global Trends 2040 adds that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic marks the most significant, singular global disruption since World War II, with health, economic, political and security implications that will ripple for years to come. Technology and supply chain disruptions are likely to manifest more intensely. Democracy is in retreat and populism is on the rise around the world.

At the regional level, ominous signs of humanitarian catastrophes, crises and armed conflicts are surfacing as witnessed in Afghanistan, Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait, leaving the door open for brinkmanship diplomacy. Plurilateral efforts toward coalition building will be strengthened in political, economic, technological and military arenas. Rogue states and autocratic regimes are seeking to turn the ongoing situations in their favor.

There are nine points that draw my attention in terms of specific policy and developments which could become the litmus tests for this part of the world next year and beyond.

First, how many U.S. allies and partners will join the U.S.-led diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics? If the number reaches a critical mass sufficient to justify the U.S. stance based on China's human rights violations, it will be a shot in the arm for President Joe Biden. Otherwise, it will not deal a decisive blow to President Xi Jinping who is seeking his third term next fall.

Second, when and how will North Korea's mischievous leader Kim Jong-un resume strategic provocations? Or will it respond positively to the U.S. offer for diplomatic talks without preconditions? Official circles in South Korea claim that North Korea is refraining from strategic provocations since late 2017 when it announced the completion of state nuclear force.

But this assessment is quite misleading. North Korea has test-fired lethal asymmetric weapons, such as new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), new Iskander-class short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and long-range cruise missiles as well as a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) ― a potential game changer.

In the past 30 years, it has shown a pattern of making major provocations before or after the inauguration of new South Korean and American administrations. For example, North Korea test-fired a longer-range missile only two days after President Moon Jae-in took office. The next South Korean administration will start in May.

Third, will President Biden adopt a "No First Use" or "Sole Purpose" policy in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)? Former President Barack Obama considered a "No First Use" policy twice ― in 2009 and in 2016 ― and rejected the change both times. Biden has said that he wants to "reduce the role of nuclear weapons" in U.S. strategy, implying to use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack ― not chemical, biological, cyber or conventional strikes, no matter how damaging.

But the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and Australia ― staunch U.S. allies ― all firmly oppose such a policy shift. They prefer to maintain calculated ambiguity. The official position of the current South Korean government is not well-known.

My own humble advice to the Biden administration is "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Any fix will be a strategically wrong signal. U.S. extended deterrence and nuclear reassurance will be perceived as empty words. This is the time to strengthen allied deterrence, not to weaken it.

Fourth is whether the declaration to put an end to the Korean War will come before the end of the Moon government. Or will it turn out to be further wishful thinking in disregard of U.S. focus on denuclearization of North Korea as well as DPRK's pursuit of nuclear power status?

Fifth is whether or not the South Korean government can join the U.S./EU-led multilateral campaign in the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and other fora against China's human rights violations. If yes, it will be in line with the spirit of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Leaders' Joint Statements but is likely to trigger China's retaliation which could be no less severe than was observed post-THAAD deployment.

For the last three years, the Moon administration even dissociated itself from co-sponsoring the annual UNHRC resolutions on DPRK human rights violations whose repercussions would be much lesser than joining anti-China campaigns.

Sixth is whether the next South Korean government will be able to join any Indo-Pacific Strategy coalitions such as the Quad, AUKUS or Five Eyes, or even reinvigorate the trilateral cooperation among U.S., Japan and South Korea. Together, these groupings constitute a new U.S. concept and policy of "integrated deterrence."

How about the U.S.-proposed new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) minus China to focus on digital standards, supply chain resiliency and clean energy, among other things? China obviously will respond to such moves in one way or another. Can the U.S. block China's membership to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) when the U.S. itself cannot afford to join in the foreseeable future?

Seventh, in view of the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, what kind of a role can the Korea-U.S. alliance or U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) play in cases of regional conflicts? Should the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty remain confined mainly to the Korean Peninsula or will it be stretched to other areas in the Pacific? The role of the USFK in the future Taiwan Strait conflict was a controversial issue in the lead-up to the bilateral understanding on strategic flexibility of 2006.

Eighth, will there be a breakthrough in the history-related impasse between Korea and Japan that will pave the way for trilateral cooperation with the U.S.? Interestingly, both major South Korean presidential candidates seem to be distancing themselves from the Moon government policy and putting forth practical diplomacy as a key campaign slogan that has implications on Korea's Japan policy.

Last, but not least, we should not lose sight of one real point. As both George Kennan and Richard Haass emphasized, foreign policy begins at home ― the impact of domestic issues on foreign affairs. This is the point where President Donald Trump and President Biden converge. The same goes for other countries as well. Upcoming election results in South Korea, Japan, the U.S. and Europe, as well as in China will have considerable repercussions on the regional and global landscape of 2022.

Stay alert to the cloud of danger, but I hope that every cloud has a silver lining. Happy and safe New Year!

Yun Byung-se is former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and taskforces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.