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But far more significant than these remarks was the roar they elicited from the 70,000 spectators gathered at Tiananmen Square. Those comments elicited the loudest cheers, in fact, during his entire speech. If such accolades were sincere and representative of what most Chinese people feel, Xi's words may augur a very dangerous future indeed.
The CCP has been especially successful in getting its message across Millennials and Generation Z ― ironically through the power of the internet, a technology, many in the West thought would ultimately bring democracy to China.
Many Western policymakers believed that capitalism would transform China into a democracy as its people prospered. However, most young Chinese seem to view the CCP as inevitable, irreplaceable, and deserving of gratitude for bringing China from extreme poverty to global prominence in the course of a single life time.
And the Communist Party made it certain by taking a decisive turn against democracy when it cracked down on large scale protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989, and quashing any challenges to its one-party rule in the ensuing decades ― all but extinguishing dissent in Hong Kong, most recently, after anti-government protests shook the city in 2019.
Its leaders have learned the lesson of the Soviet Union, where the communists lost power after opening the door to pluralism.
The CCP views soft power as something to be managed carefully ― even manufactured and manipulated. To promote China's image within and abroad, the CCP maintains a massive and well-funded United Front Work Department which runs global propaganda campaigns on behalf of Xi's version of socialism.
In a similar vein, the CCP views trade as a weapon that can boost its influence and provide geo-strategic advantages. As economist Robert Atkinson wrote recently, Hitler's Germany used global commerce "as a key tool to gain commercial and military advantage over its adversaries," turning "foreign trade into an instrument of power, or pressure, and even of conquest."
Today, Atkinson argues, China has become just such a power trader, seeking to make itself such an important market for exports of raw materials that it makes others "into dependent vassal states, worried China could cut off their exports at any time." Atkinson says China is not just another trader seeking larger markets and more profit, but an authoritarian power set on mobilizing itself to become a global hegemon.
As Xi proclaimed, "….the great revival of the Chinese nation in order to … stand more firmly and powerfully among all nations around the world." As a result, the world confronts not only a formidable trading, technological, industrial, economic and military power, but also a state willing to deploy all of these forces to make the world more suitable for its style of autocracy.
To remain in power, the CCP must continue to enrich the Chinese people, which means that China needs to continue to import vast amounts of energy, food and natural resources. It needs access to foreign markets, technology and capital.
The CCP, in other words, must either adapt to existing global norms and systems or alter them to suit Beijing's needs. Xi is trying to do both at once. China adopts global rules and practices when they benefit it and seeks international influence to transform rules and institutions it dislikes. It's a two-track strategy that China should pursue gradually.
Xi's great error may prove to be his rejection of gradualism. He showed his hand when he built and militarized islands in the South China Sea and flouted the International Court of Arbitration's ruling against China's regional claims.
Beijing's subsequent treatment of the Uyghurs, Hong Kong and Taiwan caused much of the global community to shift their thinking from "China is rising; what's in it for us?" to "China is dangerous what can we do?" As a result, Beijing now faces growing distrust and enormous challenges with the likelihood of increasing confrontation with the United States and its allies.
But the party's increasing insecurity about its grip on power led China to turn inward and ultimately, with the rise of Xi Jinping who purged corruption in the politburo to preserve loyalists and removed presidential term limits, it fell back to a personality cult not seen since Mao.
However, if China was simply a nation of evil rulers and captive masses, it would be relatively easy to deal with. It isn't. China is a complex, ambitious, aggrieved nation ― a government and a people. This relative unity of purpose is one of the major themes of the centenary.
Speaking at Tiananmen Square, Xi laid out a vision of China's future that was self-congratulatory, triumphant and aggressive. In short, the speech was aimed at forging unity within, ensuring "the party forever," and advancing China's power abroad. Xi's emphasis on nationalism, recovering "lost territories," and remolding the international order suggest tensions with the U.S. and its allies will continue.
After a century, the CCP has made a strategic mistake and played its hand too early, revealing the game and the true nature of the party.
What will the world look like in the future? I hope it's not according to Kipling ― "never the twain shall meet."
Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com) is a former lawmaker and is currently chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.