By Yun Byung-se
Five months into his presidency, U.S. President Joe Biden's foreign policy is taking shape at the right pace. This is most prominent in the evolution of his China policy. During his presidential campaign, he envisaged a long game in meeting China's challenge to the United States and across the world, while laying out some areas of possible cooperation, such as climate change, non-proliferation and the global pandemic.
The trajectory of his actions as well as words so far is a powerful indication of the recipe he has for his grand strategy on China, as was strongly recommended by several experts including through "The Longer Telegram: Toward a new American China strategy."
Benchmarking George Kennan's Long Telegram of 1946, the anonymous author lamented the lack of a coherent approach by recent U.S. administrations and argued for the adoption of a Kennan-style overarching strategy.
While the Biden team is cautious in employing Cold War terminology vis-a-vis China, actions and reactions by the two powers are ominous prequels of the coming "duel of the century," not only between the two countries themselves, but also between the U.S.-led world order and China's own aspirations.
The first in-person Sino-American "2+2" high-level meeting in Alaska in February was a forceful wake-up call. This meeting may go down in history as the most combative public high-level confrontation between Washington and Beijing since the 1979 normalization of relations, and as the opening round of President Biden's long fight to prevent the advent of a Pax Sinica.
Biden indeed declared in his first press conference in March that "China's goal to become the leading country, the wealthiest country and the most powerful country in the world is not going to happen on my watch."
At home, he took over the main thrust of Trump's hardline China policy, contrary to "Anything but Trump" expectations. The usually partisan U.S. Congress rallied behind him, starting with the adoption in April by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 281 page-long Strategic Competition Act of 2021.
The act represents a bipartisan approach toward crafting a cohesive Indo-Pacific strategy and beyond. It is designed to position the U.S. to compete with China "across all dimensions of national and international power for decades to come," and to enhance cooperation with traditional allies.
It lists up all the rationale for this unusual legislation. To put it simply, the U.S. will not stand idly by when the ''Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation'' or simply "China Dream" has been elevated to China's central domestic and foreign policies. This is in line with the Pentagon's 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy report and The Longer Telegram which termed China as a revisionist power ― no longer a status-quo power.
Abroad, the Biden team's multilateral diplomacy to form a united front of U.S. allies and partners to check Chinese influence is in full swing. It includes the first-ever Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as Quad) summit and "The Spirit of the Quad" statement, Group of Seven (G7) Summit and its joint statement, the latest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit communique as well as U.S.-Japan and Korea-U.S. summit statements.
They all refer to China's challenge in many key areas, either directly or indirectly. Among them are rules-based international order, a free and open Indo-Pacific, peace and stability in the East and South China Sea, human rights and democracy, critical and emerging technologies, coercive policies, the origin of COVID-19, Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) or Build Back Better World (B3W) global infrastructure initiative.
Especially, references to the Taiwan Straits by Japan, Korea, and G7 in the above documents are the first time-ever respectively and, as such, may have significant implications going beyond trilateral cooperation among Korea, U.S. and Japan.
In addition, President Biden's summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Geneva immediately after the G7 and NATO summits is his version of "Kissinger-ian" triangular diplomacy, exploiting the delicate rivalry between Beijing and Moscow.
As Biden declared after the G7 summit, the U.S. is back at the head of the table. This is a clear departure from Trump's "America alone" diplomacy.
The good old days of Sino-American symbiosis or "co-evolution," as once envisaged by former President Richard Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger, are coming to an end. Now, the U.S. and China are playing two very different games, like dreaming two different dreams. The U.S. is committed to a liberal international order, whereas China seeks to build its own order, not honorary membership of the West.
Liu Mingfu's 2010 book "China Dream" was more blunt in envisaging a world where the relationship between China and the U.S. will be a "marathon contest," and the "duel of the century" to restore China to its historical glory and take the U.S.'s place as world leader.
Professor Graham Allison's prognosis is more sobering, when he said, "the defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the U.S. can escape Thucydides's Trap." President Xi Jinping himself responded during a visit to Seattle in September 2015, "There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides's Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves."
It is the paradox of history that the world is on the threshold of a new Cold War and is becoming the victim of its own success. Which dream or scenario will ultimately come true? Pax Americana or the China Dream? Thucydides's Trap (a likely war) or "Kindleberger Trap" (of incapability to provide global public goods)? It will depend on how strategic competition will unfold in the coming years and decades. Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia, offers a good recipe for avoiding the war through managed strategic competition.
One big moment of truth will come sooner than later, when President Biden and President Xi are set to meet with each other probably at the G20 summit in October. But a wise counsel is in order, from John Lennon, "A dream you dream alone is only a dream. A dream you dream together is reality."
Yun Byung-se is former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
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The trajectory of his actions as well as words so far is a powerful indication of the recipe he has for his grand strategy on China, as was strongly recommended by several experts including through "The Longer Telegram: Toward a new American China strategy."
Benchmarking George Kennan's Long Telegram of 1946, the anonymous author lamented the lack of a coherent approach by recent U.S. administrations and argued for the adoption of a Kennan-style overarching strategy.
While the Biden team is cautious in employing Cold War terminology vis-a-vis China, actions and reactions by the two powers are ominous prequels of the coming "duel of the century," not only between the two countries themselves, but also between the U.S.-led world order and China's own aspirations.
The first in-person Sino-American "2+2" high-level meeting in Alaska in February was a forceful wake-up call. This meeting may go down in history as the most combative public high-level confrontation between Washington and Beijing since the 1979 normalization of relations, and as the opening round of President Biden's long fight to prevent the advent of a Pax Sinica.
Biden indeed declared in his first press conference in March that "China's goal to become the leading country, the wealthiest country and the most powerful country in the world is not going to happen on my watch."
At home, he took over the main thrust of Trump's hardline China policy, contrary to "Anything but Trump" expectations. The usually partisan U.S. Congress rallied behind him, starting with the adoption in April by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 281 page-long Strategic Competition Act of 2021.
The act represents a bipartisan approach toward crafting a cohesive Indo-Pacific strategy and beyond. It is designed to position the U.S. to compete with China "across all dimensions of national and international power for decades to come," and to enhance cooperation with traditional allies.
It lists up all the rationale for this unusual legislation. To put it simply, the U.S. will not stand idly by when the ''Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation'' or simply "China Dream" has been elevated to China's central domestic and foreign policies. This is in line with the Pentagon's 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy report and The Longer Telegram which termed China as a revisionist power ― no longer a status-quo power.
Abroad, the Biden team's multilateral diplomacy to form a united front of U.S. allies and partners to check Chinese influence is in full swing. It includes the first-ever Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as Quad) summit and "The Spirit of the Quad" statement, Group of Seven (G7) Summit and its joint statement, the latest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit communique as well as U.S.-Japan and Korea-U.S. summit statements.
They all refer to China's challenge in many key areas, either directly or indirectly. Among them are rules-based international order, a free and open Indo-Pacific, peace and stability in the East and South China Sea, human rights and democracy, critical and emerging technologies, coercive policies, the origin of COVID-19, Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) or Build Back Better World (B3W) global infrastructure initiative.
Especially, references to the Taiwan Straits by Japan, Korea, and G7 in the above documents are the first time-ever respectively and, as such, may have significant implications going beyond trilateral cooperation among Korea, U.S. and Japan.
In addition, President Biden's summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Geneva immediately after the G7 and NATO summits is his version of "Kissinger-ian" triangular diplomacy, exploiting the delicate rivalry between Beijing and Moscow.
As Biden declared after the G7 summit, the U.S. is back at the head of the table. This is a clear departure from Trump's "America alone" diplomacy.
The good old days of Sino-American symbiosis or "co-evolution," as once envisaged by former President Richard Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger, are coming to an end. Now, the U.S. and China are playing two very different games, like dreaming two different dreams. The U.S. is committed to a liberal international order, whereas China seeks to build its own order, not honorary membership of the West.
Liu Mingfu's 2010 book "China Dream" was more blunt in envisaging a world where the relationship between China and the U.S. will be a "marathon contest," and the "duel of the century" to restore China to its historical glory and take the U.S.'s place as world leader.
Professor Graham Allison's prognosis is more sobering, when he said, "the defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the U.S. can escape Thucydides's Trap." President Xi Jinping himself responded during a visit to Seattle in September 2015, "There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides's Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves."
It is the paradox of history that the world is on the threshold of a new Cold War and is becoming the victim of its own success. Which dream or scenario will ultimately come true? Pax Americana or the China Dream? Thucydides's Trap (a likely war) or "Kindleberger Trap" (of incapability to provide global public goods)? It will depend on how strategic competition will unfold in the coming years and decades. Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia, offers a good recipe for avoiding the war through managed strategic competition.
One big moment of truth will come sooner than later, when President Biden and President Xi are set to meet with each other probably at the G20 summit in October. But a wise counsel is in order, from John Lennon, "A dream you dream alone is only a dream. A dream you dream together is reality."
Yun Byung-se is former foreign minister of South Korea. He is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
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