
They are found everywhere. The lithium-ion batteries in our mobile phones, wireless headphones, tablet PCs, portable chargers, remote controls, small and large home appliances and electric vehicles power our world. For such an everyday, ubiquitous item, lithium-ion batteries are astonishingly dangerous things.
Lithium-ion battery cells combine a flammable electrolyte with a lot of stored energy. If the battery creates more heat than it can disperse (for example, because of overcharging), this can lead to a rapid uncontrolled release of heat energy, known as thermal runaway, that leads to an explosive, very high-temperature fire. Once on fire, the burning battery cells will release further highly flammable and toxic gases from their casings. What makes such fires even more dangerous is that they generate their own oxygen and therefore are very difficult to put out with traditional fire extinguishers.
The recent fire at the Aricell lithium-ion battery manufacturing plant in Hwaseong is indicative that a disaster had been waiting to happen. As more facts emerge in the aftermath of the tragic event that has left twenty-three dead, and eight seriously injured, it is clear that this was more than just an accident. It was a direct result of gross, possibly even criminal, negligence. The CCTV footage from the fire shows that the blaze started in one small spot. White smoke rises up and other batteries nearby quickly catch on fire. Employees try to move the burning batteries away and some spray the fire with a fire extinguisher, but the flame only becomes bigger and spreads fast. There is a loud explosion. The people desperately try to get away from the flame but they move in the opposite direction of the exit and are trapped with no way out. It took less than 15 seconds for the smoke to fill the room.
Workers in the lithium-ion battery manufacturing industry say fires are regular occurrences. They say that lithium-ion batteries should not be called batteries but explosives. The police investigation into the recent disaster has uncovered that there had been at least four other fires at the Aricell battery plant in the last three years, with on even occurring on June 22, just two days before the fire that took so many lives. Given these circumstances, why was Aricell so unprepared to deal with a fire breaking out? Why were there not enough precautions taken and why did so many people have to die?
We can point to at least three factors contributing to the high death toll. First, the risk was not managed properly, if at all, by the company. Although the law specifically requires lithium-ion battery cells to be stored offsite away from the manufacturing floor, the finished battery cells were stored throughout the factory floor. And because these battery cells were intended for the military, they were super-fast charging and contained very dense energy inside making them extraordinarily vulnerable to combustion. Given the higher-than-usual risk of fire, there should have been extra precautions taken, but the company failed to do this at every step of the way.
The second issue is the outsourcing of danger and risk. Aricell's factory seems to be manned in large part by subcontractors and irregular workers who are mostly migrant workers. Suspicions abound that these migrant workers may not have been employed legitimately. Although the company claims they were given regular training regarding workplace safety and a manual to help find the emergency exit easily, the fact that workers moved in the opposite direction of the exit shows that whatever training they were given was wholly inadequate.
Lastly, there was a complete lack of proper oversight not only by the company but by the government. Despite the factory having such a high fire risk, it was categorized as a “second class fire safety management structure,” meaning that the factory simply needed to conduct its own safety test and report to the fire department once a year. It was not even obliged to install a fire sprinkler system. Although fires had broken out on its premises numerous times, and despite the fact that the company that supplied migrant workers to Aricell was not licensed, there was no regulatory supervision by the Labor Ministry at all over the last five years. Instead, each year it was given an all-clear based on the self-reported assessment of the fire safety measures it claimed to have undertaken.
The government’s regulatory blind spot is systemic and not simply limited to this one factory. Despite the highly hazardous nature of military-purpose lithium-ion batteries, there is no safety standard for them because of the nature of its small and closed market. Although lithium-ion battery fires require special types of fire extinguishers, they are not a mandatory requirement — nor are fire sprinkler systems. Onsite inspections are often cursory and limited. Not enough is being done to compel companies to take better precautions to prevent disasters and often any punishment comes as too little, too late.
As if all this were not terrible enough, discrimination against migrant workers continued even after their deaths. Of the 23 who perished, 17 were Chinese of Korean ethnic origin. Compensation for victims from the company may differ depending on whether the victim is local or foreign. A truly depressing and dispiriting outcome in the aftermath was the online comments disparaging and denigrating the Chinese Korean victims and their families accusing them of exploiting the disaster to seek compensation. Just imagine how it would feel if it had been Korean workers who lost their lives working in a Chinese factory and similarly derogatory remarks were made about them and their families. It is at times like this that John Donne’s admonition comes to mind: “Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.”
Cho Hee-kyoung (hongikmail@gmail.com) is a professor at Hongik University College of Law.