Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War for South Korea

By Lee Jong-eun

Eighteen months ago, Europe experienced the first major conventional military conflict since WWII when Russia launched a so-called "special military operation" against Ukraine. Since then, the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine has continued into attrition. Ukraine's determined resistance and the West's economic and military support prevented Russia from defeating Ukraine. However, Ukraine has failed so far to retake its territory still occupied by Russian forces, particularly Crimea and the Donbas region.

For South Korea, what have been the lessons so far from the geopolitical crisis in Ukraine? I highlight four lessons relevant to South Korea in responding to its own geopolitical challenges in Northeast Asia.

First, nuclear threats have real but limited coercive leverage. Throughout the war, Russia has warned the West not to provide military support to Ukraine, often with subtle and explicit signaling of the risks of nuclear warfare. In defiance of Russia's warning, the West has equipped Ukraine's military with HIMARS rocket launchers, Patriot missile defense systems, Leopold tanks and has announced plans to deliver F-16 fighter jets. The West has also tolerated Ukraine's increasing use of drones to strike into Russia's territory.

Why has Russia's warning of nuclear warfare not deterred Western military support for Ukraine? The risk of using nuclear weapons is also too great for Putin to enforce his warning on a limited tactical objective, encouraging the West to test Russia's threat by gradually expanding the supply of sophisticated weapons to Ukraine. Russia's nuclear warning has also had limited leverage on demands the West perceives as too excessive.

Even if Putin does threaten to use nuclear weapons on New York, it is unlikely for the West to acquiesce to the demand for the surrender of Kyiv. For South Korea, the West's response to Russia's nuclear threats provides reassurance that there are limits to North Korea's nuclear coercive diplomacy. North Korea's nuclear threats are serious risks but insufficient in pressuring the U.S. government to sacrifice its geopolitical reputation and strategic interests in abandoning its alliance with South Korea.

Second, nuclear threats, however, do necessitate restraint against the provocation of a nuclear state. Western policymakers have expressed reservations toward Ukraine's attempt to recover Crimea from Russia, concerned that Putin could use tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort if Russia faces decisive defeat. Ukraine has faced contrasting signals from the West, which affirms support for Ukraine's territorial integrity but has also cautioned Ukraine not to seek maximalist victory over Russia.

South Korea is familiar with similar restraints from the U.S. in response to North Korea's provocations. In 2010, when North Korea fired on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island, the Obama administration urged South Korea's restraint in retaliation. Should North Korea engage in threatening actions against South Korea, the U.S. will likely defend South Korea but also restrain South Korea from excessive military measures against the nuclear-armed regime, potentially causing friction in the bilateral alliance.

Third, alliances are beneficial, but there are limits to support that can be expected from other allies. Ukraine has received security support from the West in fighting Russia's invasion. The West, however, has refrained from directly deploying its military to combat Russian forces. The volume of aid has also varied among individual Western nations, with some providing mostly economic aid while others also providing substantial military equipment. As the war continues, Ukraine could face tensions with the Western governments, who perceive they have already provided sufficient support to the former.

In recent years, the South Korean government has expanded security cooperation with Japan and NATO, reinforcing the bilateral U.S.-ROK alliance with a multilateral security partnership with states sharing common strategic objectives of maintaining the "rules-based order" from the revisionist powers such as China and Russia. Though South Korea should take advantage of bilateral and multilateral security ties, South Korea should also have realistic expectations of the level of support it can receive from its security partners. As individual security partners will contribute to South Korea's security based on their strategic capacity and constraints, South Korea's own capacity and resolve are critical to overcoming its geopolitical challenges. In turn, South Korea should also define and communicate the realistic level of support it is committed to contributing to the security of South Korea's allies and partners.

Fourth, countries will have to manage coexistence with their adversaries eventually. Whether the military conflict ends eventually with an armistice or a peace settlement, Ukraine will face the future challenge of coexistence with an adversarial Russia. Even if Ukraine is not accepted into NATO, post-war Ukraine will likely align with the West to strengthen security deterrence against Russia. However, despite the continued adversity, it is in Ukraine's and the West's interest to establish predictable and stable relations with Russia that could mitigate the renewal of the destructive military conflict in Europe.

South Korea is moving away from "strategic ambiguity" in relations with China and Russia and has been aligning more explicitly with the U.S. and Japan. Such an alignment might be a necessary strategic response to counter China and Russia's assertive revisionist foreign policies. Nonetheless, the two countries and North Korea are geographic neighbors with whom South Korea has to coexist. As the phrase "keep your friends close and your adversaries closer" implies South Korea's diplomacy with strategic adversaries will be just as critical as diplomacy with strategic allies in ensuring South Korea's present and future security.

The Russia-Ukraine War has caused destruction in Ukraine and has transformed Europe's security environment. The war has also provided costly lessons for policymakers on nuclear deterrence, alliances and geopolitical coexistence. Through learning these lessons, I hope South Korea and its neighbors can ensure a similar geopolitical crisis does not happen also in Northeast Asia.

Lee Jong-eun, Ph.D., is assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.