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Korea has cited three reasons to expedite the Chinese President's visit to Korea: one, as a return visit for Moon's visit to China, two, because China's leader has not come to South Korea since the inauguration of the current South Korean President, and three, to indicate an official "recovery" of bilateral relations between the two nations following the height of the THAAD discord in 2017.
China often describes itself as a "strategic state," which is thought to imply that the nation prioritizes strategic thinking in international relations. Even though South Korea has invited Xi to Seoul several times over the past two years, the fact that a visit is yet to take place may be a testament to the fact that a visit is low on Beijing's list of diplomatic priorities and needs.
Ordinary South Koreans don't seem to be paying much attention to whether Xi's visit takes place or not. The matter, however, has been picked up on and reported by media outlets, after the South Korean government has been publicly and repeatedly expressing interest in Xi's visit.
On Feb. 20, President Moon held a phone conversation with Xi to discuss the ongoing coronavirus epidemic. According to a presidential Cheong Wa Dae briefing to reporters, the Korean side again at this time openly expressed its expectation for Xi's visit to Seoul sometime during the first half of this year.
However, records of the phone conversation posted on the Chinese foreign ministry's website show no mention of Xi's expected visit to South Korea. The fact that a matter of a major interest to Korea is not reflected in the Chinese record warrants attention.
Regarding Xi's expected visit to South Korea, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha, who attended the Munich Security Conference in Germany on Feb. 15, said after bilateral talks with Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi, "We will proceed with it in the first half of the year, as previously agreed by the two countries." According to the Chinese foreign ministry records, however, Wang did not use the term "first half" of the year. Rather, the word he used was "this year." Moreover, rather than using the official term of "summit" to describe a meeting between South Korea and China, Wang instead used the generic term, "high-level contact," which is ambiguous.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang is also expected to visit South Korea this year, with this meeting counting as "high-level contact."
The summit meeting between the leaders is also ultimately determined by the strategic judgment of each country's needs. Korean voters began to voice their curiosity over why the Moon administration is so keen ― perhaps even risking looking desperate ― to have Xi visit.
Interestingly, the more Korea wants the visit, the more China seems to make the visit look hard to achieve. Late last year, when the matter was brought to the then Chinese Ambassador to Seoul, Chu Guohong, Chu said the Chinese will "kaolu" the visit, which literally means "consider." Those familiar with the Chinese language understand that "kaolu" implies uncertainty. It is a word used when avoiding full commitment. It's more like saying, "we'll see what happens."
The Chinese side, instead of simply acknowledging and accepting the invitation, is engaging in diplomatic word play. Many South Korean politicians look up to China as the land of Confucius, a virtuous and sincere sage. But this behavior from the Chinese is simply not Confucian.
Through various, bilateral consultation channels, Xi's visit to South Korea was initially set to materialize sometime in the second half of 2019. It was later postponed to sometime during the first half of 2020. Now, it has been yet again changed to "sometime" this year.
Under these circumstances, even if Xi does visit Seoul, the Chinese side may misinterpret "Xi's visit itself" as a sufficient diplomatic gift for South Korea. This is because Seoul has not hidden their desperation to host him here. The misunderstanding will have been caused by the South Korean side.
On the other hand, the summit "gift" that China will demand from South Korea could include issues regarding Seoul's siding between Washington and Beijing, amid deepening the U.S.-China rivalry. South Korea is a formal ally of the United States, and China has been working hard to weaken Seoul's alliance with Washington, calling it a "Cold War relic."
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.