Analyzing Jang's execution

By Bernard Rowan

Over the past weeks, I've read many stories about the trial and execution of Jang Song-thaek and their significance.

One leading theory is that background business disputes between people loyal to Jang, Jang himself and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un led to a dispute in which Kim couldn't save face without convincing action.

Jang refused a direct order; Jang hadn't followed previous orders; Jang followed his own plan in orchestrating the North's economy.

Most experts discredit the notion that Jang's execution is a tipping point for the Kim regime or a coup. The information available inclines me to agree with this assessment.

Just because one disobedient or dissenting leader, or even a cadre of associates, faces domestic justice doesn't mean the entire government is reeling. Many hope that North Korea's government will fail, but that dream isn't yet a reality.

No one should have romantic notions about the meaning of Jang's execution, even if it did point to a problem for North Korea.

The trial and execution occurred openly and boldly. This is an important analytical point. The North's government, filled with secrecy, largely succeeds where so many free governments fail. It keeps hidden what it wants to hide.

But Kim broadcast this problem worldwide. We witnessed Jang taken out of the court. That was propaganda for the North Korean people.

Kim's purge of Jang arose from a twofold consideration. First, an internal division existed. Jang's "crimes" didn't mean the end of Kim's regime. They did want an answer to the question, "Who rules?"

As most intelligence suggests, Jang was the second-most-powerful person in the North. In that role, he wielded significant command over the North's economy, in particular over the means used to barter and gain favorable concessions from China.

Jang's refusal to follow orders created a challenge to Kim's authority over economic and social issues. Kim wouldn't want the story of Jang's misdeeds to betray the limits of his regime's power. He had to act.

We might think Jang's political associates would face similar results. And of course, we know that authorities rounded up members of Jang's family to meet the North's justice and uncertain fates.

Removing Jang will become a key moment in Kim's political history as a leader. Jang was Kim's kingmaker, a Disraeli or regent and key watchdog for him.

Jang had many powerful supporters. Bringing him to account would lessens the possibility or specter of a power struggle or internal crisis.

Kim addressed the matter openly and clearly. That also meant linking Jang to the North's internal mythology. That's the second part of my consideration. Kim has tied the story of Jang's treason to the continuing melodrama of North Korea's revolutionary heroism.

Kim has succeeded rhetorically in separating Jang's offenses from the notion of internal governmental failure or lack of control over his leading apparatchiks. It plays more like an action to shore up the rearguard against American and South Korean antirevolutionary currents in his country.

Internal divisions, real or imagined, threaten totalitarian imagery. Divisions also favor finding a convenient scapegoat. North Korea has lived this way for a long time.

In the Jang matter, Kim has shielded himself and gained time for his vision by linking Jang's betrayal to the running dogs and anti-American meta-narrative.

Read Kim's declaration that 2014 will be a year for improved relations with the South in that way. We shouldn't hold our breath that "The Year of the Horse" will mark improved relations with the North, not if that depends on helpful and creative outreach by the Kim government. Standard overtures will achieve nothing.

Don't look for a promise of a nonnuclear North Korea with regular inspections by international teams of experts. Don't wait for a proposal to demilitarize the region between North and South and turn it into a zone of international cooperation.

We won't see a summit between Kim, Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama to draw down the military forces arrayed on opposite sides of the beautiful Korean peninsula.

Ending the sale of weapons to rogue states and forming free economic markets to international development remain distant fantasies.

We'll continue to see Kim's regime settle itself, using any means at its disposal. Just as Kim's father succeeded in consolidating power by playing off internal factions and removing those of doubtful loyalty, his son follows the same motif.

Even though the North is bankrupt and an "illegitimate" state, its cadres and control mechanics have managed the Kims' non-elective succession. Jang's execution settled the transition.

And, as we might note in looking at American and South Korean foreign policies, expect the "wait-and-see attitude" to work no better this year than last. The meaning? I say Jang's execution will stifle the forces of change in North Korea for some time.

Bernard Rowan is assistant provost for curriculum and assessment, professor of political science and faculty athletics representative at Chicago State University, where he has served for 20 years. Contact him at browan10@yahoo.com.