A new way of looking at islets

By Bernard Rowan

Things are heating up again in an area of the East China Sea claimed by China and Japan. We heard last week that China declared authority over airspace near Diaoyudao, which is called Senkaku in Japan. This area has been contested between the two nations for some time. Recently, after the Japanese privatized Senkaku, it has been contested somewhat even more.

The United States, Japan and South Korea have conducted military drills in the general area. Commercial airlines have complied with notification provisions out of concern for the safety of their passengers and crew. China has not taken any threatening actions, although tough media rhetoric has occurred. China also will conduct military exercises in the East China Sea.

Its first super carrier, The Liaoning, set sail recently, perhaps bound for the area. The United States has indicated it will not deviate at all from longstanding navigation routes and military patrols. The Obama administration has affirmed its treaty obligations to Japan but avoids further intervention, hoping that Japan and China can work things out.

Over the past two years, similar types of "hotspot incidents" have occurred regarding other islets, including Dokdo and the Spratly Islands. Likewise, military powers have conducted military drills near disputed water and sea zones. Commercial ships and fishing boats also have occasioned warnings, flyovers, the scrambling of coast guard units, and other types of responses.

There are at least two basic ways to view these incidents. The first arises from the rival national claims of the countries involved in the various disputed territories. The second arises from the changing character of international and superpower relations, which now accents the Asian region ever more.

The excellent work, "Korean Maritime Sovereignty," published by the Korea Institute of Public Administration, and edited by Park Eung-kyuk and the late Park Chang-seok, describes and details the probity of Korean claims to the Dokdo and Ieodo islets.

Just so, it also sheds light on the claims of Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines to Senkaku and Spratly islands. The Korea Times devotes regular columns to the Dokdo issue, and a great many scholars and commentators have weighed in on all of these disputes.

My point is different with regards the nation-state and national interest vector of the troubled islets. We are never going to be free of these issues in our world of national interest thinking! That is because there is absolutely no way neatly or fully to disentangle the boundaries and border zones of sea and airspace between the contending nations in many of these disputes.

Those boundaries set by treaties and adjudicated by global powers past, present, and future can always become disputed through rival historical claims. The World Court has power only by voluntary submission to its findings. This type of status quo begs power and force games, serious games, of the kind we've witnessed and will continue to witness.

The United States has indicated its international military and foreign policies will "pivot" to Asia. China's power vector is ascending. That country is intent on building a world-class navy. China will need both military and commercial seapower to obtain the many raw materials its peoples require overtime. It is perhaps also the case that America's power is falling a bit.

South Korea and Japan have been hemmed in regarding national military potential and are gradually assuming greater self-responsibility. With less American military cover and a number of long-standing historical and contemporary political conflicts or tensions between Korea, Japan, and China, the situation is ripening for instability and miscalculation.

Here is where we should all take a great pause. We should transcend our mutual preoccupation with power and national interests. It may be that transcendent thinking is impossible except at the margins today. That's because all nations now seek to imitate Euro-American power vectors in their foreign and military policy.

All seek scarce shares of navigable waters, airspace, resources and buffer zones. The power drive occasioned by scarcity is neither new nor comforting in this context. Exclusivity breeds covetousness.

We could do better though. First, we must understand that it's impossible, for example, to avoid overlapping jurisdiction claims and preserve each nation's interests in the East China Sea. Second, we need visionary leaders in all nations to deliberate and implement joint, shared zones for commercial use, including cost sharing.

Of course, these areas also would have to become joint zones for peaceful relations between all affected nations and free navigation as well as flight, with proper notification according to established protocols. It would become necessary to create a joint defense for international amity and comity in the created zones.

We must start to take back the seas and airways for international humanity! We must begin to build the kind of world that will permit even more organized and mutually beneficial use of the skies and seas. It also must be one in which we use the earth's resources responsibly and share the cost for doing so. We need a new way of looking at islets that accents soft power and the good of all peoples.

Bernard Rowan is assistant provost for curriculum and assessment, professor of political science and faculty athletics representative at Chicago State University, where he has worked for 20 years. He can be reached at browan10@yahoo.com.