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| Gettyimagesbank |
By Andrew Hyde
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How the negotiation process between Washington and Seoul unfolds, and how the two allies respond to the contradictory and confusing signals sent from Pyongyang, will be a critical factor in setting the trajectory of South Korea's security strategy in the 2020s.
The current talks cannot be construed as simply periodic negotiations to be muddled through, with tough choices put off to another day. They will set the tone and direction for the alliance in a period of rapid geopolitical and technological transformation.
Seoul should not only be smart in its negotiating tactics for the successful continuation of the SMA, it must also get ahead of the curve and chart its own 21st century global and regional role, making constructive and creative proposals for how the ROK and the United States can transform their alliance to meet emerging challenges and set out a roadmap for a peaceful and secure Northeast Asia.
While significant differences in the bargaining positions taken by the United States and ROK in SMA negotiations have been a constant feature of the talks since their beginning in 1991, this time around, Washington's demand for a fivefold increase in Seoul's contribution shocked even Korean conservatives and has set the stage for an epic clash that could be quite damaging to perceptions of the alliance in both countries.
The unusually steep demand from the United States can in part be attributed to the business tactics that President Donald Trump made famous in his 1987 book "Art of the Deal." Trump spelled it out there: "My style of deal-making is quite simple and straightforward. I aim very high, and then I just keep pushing and pushing and pushing to get what I'm after."
Often, however, as the record shows, he often concedes to a final result that is far less than the original demand. That is not to say that the process itself won't exact a cost; the fallout from the opening U.S. demand is already having a significant and profound impact on Korean public opinion about the alliance and the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. This has been further compounded by the extent to which Trump has blurred the lines between alliance relations and economic competition, making it seem as if Seoul's support for U.S. troops is in the same space as increased access to the automobile market.
The respective views in Seoul and Washington over the past couple of decades of the purpose of the U.S. military presence in South Korea has been defined by an inherent tension between Washington's larger regional goals and Seoul's high-wire domestic balancing act that ties the troop presence exclusively to defense of the ROK.
Most U.S. troop deployments outside the continental United States serve regional strategic goals, such as troops in Germany to stand up to Russia and bases in east Africa to project power across the Middle East. U.S. troops in Korea, however, are there only for the express purpose of defending South Korea; that has been the price for gaining continued Korean public support. Seoul's view has generally prevailed as evidenced by an explicit acknowledgment in the U.S.-ROK SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) that states U.S. forces are present on the Korean Peninsula "only for the safety … [of the ROK]."
The current tussle over the ROK's SMA contribution may result in a fundamental recalibration of that approach. Looking ahead to the regional strategic challenges that the U.S. will face in East Asia in the 2020s, many U.S. military and diplomatic strategists sense a renewed opportunity to remake the U.S. military presence in the ROK into another platform for responding to regional contingencies, particularly possible threats arising from an assertive China. While that was not the intention of the 2016 THAAD anti-missile system deployment to South Korea, Beijing's concerns vividly foreshadowed this possibility.
The ROK continues to resist expanding the interpretation of the USFK's mission, suggesting that the U.S. force presence remains focused on deterrence, and, if necessary, responding to threats from Pyongyang. To reinforce and complement that position, the ROK has made an effort, often at the behest of Washington, to play an active role in far-flung trouble spots such as Afghanistan or counter-piracy operations in the Red Sea. Those contributions, however, have been undertaken on an ad hoc basis and do not represent a large strategic goal of the ROK, other than a general commitment to demonstrate support for Washington's priorities.
A loosening of the bilateral alliance through contentious negotiations over cost sharing for U.S. troops on the peninsula could unleash a seismic shift in strategic calculations by both Washington and Seoul, fueling, perhaps, a fundamental reconsideration of the ROK's security interests and future options. An "America first" U.S. foreign policy might easily conclude that a hamstrung strategic role for the USFK focused only on the Korean Peninsula is no longer a national interest when priced against the needed future power projection throughout East Asia. Fraying public opinion in the ROK, in turn, could lead Seoul to a more fundamental reconsideration of the ROK's security interests that is less dependent on an American security umbrella.
To avoid such a stark result, the ROK should widen its foreign policy aperture and look beyond Washington to realize its security and foreign policy goals for the 2020s. Addressing the challenge of the DPRK will require a sustained, complex and global effort within which the ricochet diplomacy between the U.S. and DPRK will be a factor but not the central guiding feature. As another U.S. presidential election looms, domestic economic and political concerns are vacuuming up U.S. public attention. What little bandwidth remains for foreign policy has been consumed by the challenges posed by Russia, Iran and China. The ROK must aggressively pursue its own long-term interests, being mindful of Washington's concerns, but not allowing them to dominate, or paralyze, Seoul's efforts.
Instead of keeping its head down on global and regional security concerns, Seoul can take advantage of its expertise and its own economic and technological strengths to consider what may be possible. It can also articulate its position more effectively and define its enduring security interests.
Washington's incremental retreat from the global stage does not mean that Seoul must depend on the support of Beijing, Tokyo or Moscow ― despite the bizarre comments of President Moon's security adviser Moon Chung-in. Rather, Seoul must pursue its own cooperative agreements in trade, development, diplomacy and security for its own interests globally, but also consider how the United States can be brought into those agreements when appropriate.
Seoul will need to do its homework about what those relationships will be with countries ranging from natural allies to competitors and regional rivals.
A related question is what will be the ROK's global posture and its international responsibilities. As an economic and technological leader and the world's 12th largest economy, many observers feel that the ROK has an enduring obligation to ensure freedom of navigation on the high seas and to respond to threats of instability from terrorism, conflict and rogue state adventurism. Such a shift will require greater independence and diversification, including new relations with China that assert the ROK's independence but also protect global commercial interests.
The ROK could use its strength in international trade and become a leader in making full use of trade agreements, notably the five-year-old free trade agreement with the European Union (EU), as a basis for an expansion in cooperation that would include political and security concerns and systematically identifying shared interests.
There may even be a space to establish a military presence near vital trade and oil routes in or near the Middle East that can raise Seoul's profile as a trusted partner.
South Korea has the potential to play a vital role on the international stage ― more independent of the United States. All that is required is the imagination and self-confidence to make full use of this opportunity.
Andrew Hyde is a Senior Fellow at the Asia Institute in Washington, D.C., a multinational research institution that addresses global issues, with a focus on Asia. He is a former U.S. diplomat and is now working as a political risk and business consultant in the Washington, D.C., area.
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