Deepening asymmetry between Korea, China

By Lee Seong-hyon

I once received an apology from a Chinese woman who was enrolled in an MBA course at Tsinghua University, the alma mater of Chinese President Xi Jinping. After learning that she was from Guangdong Province, I mentioned that Wang Yang, then-Guangdong's party secretary, had recently visited Korea. I also said that there would be a Korea-China summit soon. It was a gesture to build rapport with her.

The response from the Chinese woman was something unexpected. "Why would our leader go to a small country (xiao guo) like Korea? I think you heard it wrong." What started as a casual conversation at a coffee shop in the College Boulevard in Beijing just ended there.

Guangdong ranks first in GDP in China. In 2018, the province's GDP was already close to Korea's total GDP. The fact that the economic size of one Chinese province is similar to that of all of South Korea as a nation, warrants some soul-searching on the part of South Korea, given its symbolism in bilateral relations.

At the time of establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, South Korea's economy was about equal to that of China with 1.4 billion people. South Korea was a smaller partner in size but had a much more efficient economy. Things have changed.

According to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), Korean economic dependence on China after the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 was 25.8 percent, up from 25.1 percent a year earlier.

South Korea has been making efforts to diversify its export markets, after experiencing China's economic retaliation over the THAAD dispute. But its dependence on China is intensifying.

South Korea, at one point, was an economic model for China. Hwang Byung-tae, South Korea's 1993-95 ambassador to China, was famous for giving lectures to senior Chinese officials about South Korea's economic transformation. Now, it's an old story.

The sense of South Korea becoming less important an economic partner to China has political implications too. Economy and politics often go together in diplomacy.

For instance, among the Chinese state-run research intuitions and think tanks, there is less demand for Korea-related policy papers and briefs these days. These organizations all serve their readers ― the Chinese political leadership. Supply and demand also applies to the policy community. It indicates there is less demand for Korea-related policies. In a positive light, it could mean there are fewer troublesome issues between South Korea and China. In a negative light, it could mean South Korea's importance to China is gradually diminishing.

This could also lead to a downward adjustment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. Xi Jinping's much-anticipated visit to South Korea didn't materialize last year and it was attributed to COVID-19. The fact of the matter is that President Moon Jae-in made that invitation first in December 2017. Over the last four years, the South Korean side repeated invitations. If Xi really wanted to visit South Korea, he missed many opportunities.

If it was really because of COVID-19, Beijing and Seoul could also have at least fielded a video summit, which China often holds with other nations these days.

Meanwhile, there is room to review the recent controversies in bilateral ties, including Xi Jinping's remarks on the Korean War, Chinese netizens' attacks on BTS, as well as the Chinese claim that the Korean kimchi is of Chinese origin.

Some in South Korea view this as an expression of China's lack of confidence in soft power toward South Korea. However, reflecting from the 30-year trajectory of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, the essence of this may be the deepening of the overall asymmetrical relationship, and the Chinese increasing sense of superiority, not the other way around.

Seoul-Beijing relations will mark their 30th anniversary next year. While examining individual issues such as THAAD is important, it is also equally important to have a clear view of the overall direction of the bilateral relationship and how both sides perceive each other. The recent public sentiment, in addition to the political ties in Seoul and Beijing, will also carry weight as to how their future relationship fares.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.

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