By Lee Seong-hyon
A recent court ruling over a key historical issue between South Korea and Japan has emerged as another major impediment to Seoul-Tokyo ties.
On Jan. 8, the Seoul Central District Court ruled in favor of South Korean victims of Japan's wartime sex slavery, ordering the Japanese government to pay 100 million won ($91,500) in compensation to each of the 12 victims who had filed the case. "The defendant's illegal activities are recognized and the plaintiffs suffered from severe mental and physical pain," the court said.
The verdict came almost five years after the case was filed. When the ruling came out, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga called the decision "utterly unacceptable," but said he had no intention of appealing the ruling because the Japanese government would not accept submission to Korea's jurisdiction under the principle of national exemption.
In a broader view, the Seoul-Tokyo entanglement was part of the larger contention between Korea and Japan on their differences over the 1965 normalization treaty, which Japan has used as the basis to claim that all colonial-era settlements were completed when it provided grants and loans under the Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement attached to the treaty.
Acrimonious emotions toward each other remain high in both South Korea and Japan, leaving much uncertainty for the future trajectory of the bilateral relationship. Both Japan and South Korea prioritize their respective relationships with the United States and China ― the two heavyweight stakeholders in the region ― at the expense of their mutual relationship. Seoul and Tokyo feel ambivalent about just how important each is to the other, at a time when geopolitical fluidity is increasing in East Asia.
Uncertainty, if not pessimism, runs deep because the current deadlock is also part of deeply embedded issues of history and territory, to which there is no easy solution. The two nations reached a so-called "landmark" agreement in 2015 in this regard. However, some condemned the move as a political "collusion" between the two governments prodded by Washington, not genuine detente between the two peoples, so as to expedite the U.S.-led regional moves to counter China.
In fact, relational defeatism is so great that some even suggest allowing time to solve the problem. There is no reason to believe that time will run its healing course and salvage the relationship, which is at its lowest since the two countries normalized relations in 1965. The relationship will drift further apart without active intervention.
Some say the issue really is about the narrative over the issue of wartime sex slavery. Others presume it is in fact a veiled legal affair that may open up a flood of fresh lawsuits if the Japanese government acknowledges its legal responsibilities (they were not acknowledged in the 2015 agreement), not to mention domestic opposition especially from Japan's right-wing elements. Still others say it is essentially a moral issue. These are all valid points and underscore the different aspects of the convoluted matter.
But what is missing in the debate is the underlying psychology and attitude that often eludes analysis. Seoul and Tokyo brush each other aside as secondary stakeholders as they muscle their diplomatic resources and attention around in coping with the seismic geopolitical shift led by Beijing and Washington, their most important economic and security partners.
Meanwhile, Seoul and Tokyo feel ambiguous toward each other's strategic values. Both countries see each other as a less important security partner compared to Washington. They also see each other as a less important economic partner compared to Beijing. Prioritizing their relations with Washington for security and Beijing for the economy, and mulling over their own hedging strategy between the two superpowers, Seoul and Tokyo are simply not sure just how important the other side is.
Thus, there is less interest and enthusiasm to tackle historical matters. Both sides are locked in a wait-and-see mentality of how much damage the other side can tolerate by cold-shouldering each other. Given that Seoul and Tokyo feel that they are dealing with more important issues at hand, they are willing to relegate their bilateral relationship to the back burner. This explains why it is so hard to find diplomatic zeal in Seoul and Tokyo to seek a solution. This underlying psychology persists and dampens political will. Left unattended, the relationship will be pummeled by hardline voices on both sides.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute
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On Jan. 8, the Seoul Central District Court ruled in favor of South Korean victims of Japan's wartime sex slavery, ordering the Japanese government to pay 100 million won ($91,500) in compensation to each of the 12 victims who had filed the case. "The defendant's illegal activities are recognized and the plaintiffs suffered from severe mental and physical pain," the court said.
The verdict came almost five years after the case was filed. When the ruling came out, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga called the decision "utterly unacceptable," but said he had no intention of appealing the ruling because the Japanese government would not accept submission to Korea's jurisdiction under the principle of national exemption.
In a broader view, the Seoul-Tokyo entanglement was part of the larger contention between Korea and Japan on their differences over the 1965 normalization treaty, which Japan has used as the basis to claim that all colonial-era settlements were completed when it provided grants and loans under the Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement attached to the treaty.
Acrimonious emotions toward each other remain high in both South Korea and Japan, leaving much uncertainty for the future trajectory of the bilateral relationship. Both Japan and South Korea prioritize their respective relationships with the United States and China ― the two heavyweight stakeholders in the region ― at the expense of their mutual relationship. Seoul and Tokyo feel ambivalent about just how important each is to the other, at a time when geopolitical fluidity is increasing in East Asia.
Uncertainty, if not pessimism, runs deep because the current deadlock is also part of deeply embedded issues of history and territory, to which there is no easy solution. The two nations reached a so-called "landmark" agreement in 2015 in this regard. However, some condemned the move as a political "collusion" between the two governments prodded by Washington, not genuine detente between the two peoples, so as to expedite the U.S.-led regional moves to counter China.
In fact, relational defeatism is so great that some even suggest allowing time to solve the problem. There is no reason to believe that time will run its healing course and salvage the relationship, which is at its lowest since the two countries normalized relations in 1965. The relationship will drift further apart without active intervention.
Some say the issue really is about the narrative over the issue of wartime sex slavery. Others presume it is in fact a veiled legal affair that may open up a flood of fresh lawsuits if the Japanese government acknowledges its legal responsibilities (they were not acknowledged in the 2015 agreement), not to mention domestic opposition especially from Japan's right-wing elements. Still others say it is essentially a moral issue. These are all valid points and underscore the different aspects of the convoluted matter.
But what is missing in the debate is the underlying psychology and attitude that often eludes analysis. Seoul and Tokyo brush each other aside as secondary stakeholders as they muscle their diplomatic resources and attention around in coping with the seismic geopolitical shift led by Beijing and Washington, their most important economic and security partners.
Meanwhile, Seoul and Tokyo feel ambiguous toward each other's strategic values. Both countries see each other as a less important security partner compared to Washington. They also see each other as a less important economic partner compared to Beijing. Prioritizing their relations with Washington for security and Beijing for the economy, and mulling over their own hedging strategy between the two superpowers, Seoul and Tokyo are simply not sure just how important the other side is.
Thus, there is less interest and enthusiasm to tackle historical matters. Both sides are locked in a wait-and-see mentality of how much damage the other side can tolerate by cold-shouldering each other. Given that Seoul and Tokyo feel that they are dealing with more important issues at hand, they are willing to relegate their bilateral relationship to the back burner. This explains why it is so hard to find diplomatic zeal in Seoul and Tokyo to seek a solution. This underlying psychology persists and dampens political will. Left unattended, the relationship will be pummeled by hardline voices on both sides.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute
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