Next 30 years of Korea-China ties

By Lee Seong-hyon

South Korea and China recently agreed to form the so-called "Korea-China Relations Future Development Committee." The duo are one year away from earmarking the 30th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations. The committee is intended to shape the next 30 years of bilateral ties. To look at the future, it's first warranted to review the past.

Seoul and Beijing used to be ideological adversaries during the Cold War when South Korea was a staunch anti-Communist nation. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two in 1992, the relationship has developed mainly in terms of economic cooperation.

Bilateral cooperation in the economic sector unfolded robustly until the THAAD dispute caused a rift in relations. Looking back, active management of the conflicting elements between the two sides was seen as not enough ― for instance on North Korea. A former diplomat who had been involved in Korea-China relations from their early diplomatic inception, observed: "Except for the North Korean nuclear issue, there were no problems with Korea-China relations." So maybe now they are facing turbulence ahead.

To be more precise, there have been foue major enduring problems with existing relations between Seoul and Beijing, and they can be summarized as North Korea, the Korea-U.S. alliance, asymmetric relations between Korea and China, and the anti-China and anti-Korea sentiment.

There have been times when the two have coordinated well on how to approach the North Korean nuclear issue, but there have been also many disagreements. Regarding Seoul's relationship with Washington, China has constantly taken issue with the ROK-U.S. alliance. In particular, the characterization of whether the alliance is part of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy (now, the Indo-Pacific Strategy) to curb the "rise of China," rather than solely dealing with North Korea. Regarding this matter, Beijing constantly tried to confirm it whenever a new South Korean administration was elected.

The "asymmetrical relationship" and "anti-China and anti-Korean sentiment" have only received sporadic media attention, like a wound left to fester. There has not been enough recognition and response to the seriousness of the matter.

According to the Pew Research Center, 75 percent of the South Korean public have unfavorable views toward China, and 83 percent of them have no confidence that Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping will do the right thing regarding world affairs. There is a quip that South Korea's ruling liberal camp which President Moon Jae-in belongs to, is prone to Chinese manipulation as they believe China's role is essential to resolving the North Korean issue and eventual unification of the two Koreas. The two Koreas have been divided essentially since WWII.

The anti-China sentiment among the South Korean public is at a record-high level, as far as this author remembers. South Korea hosted a THAAD missile defense system as an ally of the United States. Some Koreans therefore believe Beijing's retaliation against South Korea over THAAD would not have transpired if China had been a democracy. There is a growing cynicism about the Chinese political system among the Korean public, who have witnessed China's socialist uniformity and totalitarian information control during the COVID-19 crisis. South Korea, the biggest victim of the Korean War, felt gravely hurt by Xi Jinping's recent remarks on the war that disregards history, as well as the Chinese netizens' unbridled nationalism, as seen in the BTS fiasco.

The reason that the relationship between Korea and China has gradually changed to asymmetric relations with "the playground tilting toward China" lies in the change in economic power disparity. In 2019, the size of China's economy was nine times that of Korea. Over the years, while China's trade dependence on Korea has been similar or diminished, Korea's trade dependence on China has deepened. As seen in the THAAD retaliation, China has already begun to use Korea's dependence on trade as a means of political pressure on Seoul.

Seoul and Beijing have not had a chance to thaw the stalled bilateral relations for four years since the THAAD crisis, as President Xi Jinping's expected visit to South Korea didn't transpire in 2020 due to COVID-19.

In 2021, while the global coronavirus pandemic still continues, the recovery of Korea-China relations may still be difficult due to the domestic political schedule here including the mayoral by-elections in Seoul and Busan, and the presidential election campaign that will ensue immediately afterwards.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute.

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