By Andrew Hammond
The Ukraine conflict entered its third month in April with little greater clarity on the likely outcome. It is in this context of uncertainty that scenario planning can help to build preparedness by seeking to illuminate the diverse, possible futures that could emerge.
Two of the critical uncertainties which will shape the war's future are: whether it will end in 2022, or continue potentially well beyond; and secondly, whether the conflict will be restricted to Ukraine's borders, or extend into other countries, including possibly NATO nations.
Four scenarios flow from these uncertainties, with the least-positive outcome for most people and organizations being the one that could see the conflict escalate beyond Ukraine, to involve NATO countries, and continue into 2023. Conversely, the least-worst scenario is probably the one where the war remains confined to Ukraine, and ends in 2022. However, even then, there will be very significant impacts going forward.
This latter scenario, which would be an "uneasy peace," is closest to the situation which prevailed before February's invasion of Ukraine, when there were continual tensions with Russia, but no full-on conflict. However, the big difference between then and now is that Moscow's incursion means the Kremlin now holds significant amounts of ground in the country that it appears unlikely to want to return. I
ndeed, some Western intelligence sources say that what the Russian leadership favors is a Korean Peninsula-type outcome with a "new" pro-Moscow state, akin to North Korea, bordering Russia.
If this scenario is borne out, much of the sanctions regime against Russia put in place since February is likely to remain, potentially for years to come. This possibility was highlighted by U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo when he said that the world's biggest companies "have a choice to make" as to whether to "choose to help Russia" or "continue to do business with the 30 plus countries" that have imposed sanctions.
While the post-February sanctions regime therefore appears most likely to remain, one key caveat to this was highlighted by U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss when she said that it could be rolled back if Russia changes course dramatically, possibly after a leadership change.
As much as the last few weeks have been traumatic for Ukrainian people, over 4 million of whom have become refugees, this is by no means the worst-case scenario. That future, which might be called "World War III," is most likely to be realized if the conflict escalates beyond Ukraine, plus continues into 2023. A key question here, in the event that NATO countries become embroiled, is what China's reaction would be ― building from its qualified rhetorical support of Russia so far.
While this scenario still seems unlikely to many, it cannot be dismissed. While NATO is doing what it can to support Ukraine without getting entangled in a direct military confrontation with Russia, miscalculation by one or both sides is a real concern.
The longer the conflict goes on, the greater the risk of a stray Russian missile hitting a NATO country that borders Ukraine, or the taking out of a Western warship or jet. The allies have bolstered their defenses along their eastern flank, meaning that there is a lot more military hardware and personnel in the region, raising the risk of mistakes.
Chillingly, this scenario may also be the most likely to see the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, not only would the sanctions regime grow, there would be a wider international economic collapse, expediting moves toward de-globalization.
An alternative scenario that would also see the conflict continue into 2023 is a "war of attrition." The difference here is that the war would remain within Ukraine's borders, and could see Moscow gain more ground in what may ultimately lead to guerrilla-style combat. While this scenario may not be the worst case, the refugee crisis would deteriorate further, and there could be prolonged economic fallout.
A final scenario, a "new era of superpower tensions," would see the all-out military conflict end in 2022, but nonetheless remain very dangerous in terms of increasingly becoming a proxy war for the great powers. Rather than resulting in a massive conflagration like a "World War III," there would be more of a Cold War-style outcome, in which nations like China provide indirect assistance.
So while this last scenario may be less catastrophic than a "World War III," it would still have a chilling effect on the world economy. It would also bring a definitive end to the geopolitical era which began in the early 1990s with the Soviet Union's collapse.
In reality, the Ukraine conflict's endgames may combine features of all four scenarios. Each of them represents plausible futures that, while unlikely to materialize in exactly the ways outlined, provide a guiding post to the complexity of the future, with the goal of helping better anticipate the changes still to come.
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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Two of the critical uncertainties which will shape the war's future are: whether it will end in 2022, or continue potentially well beyond; and secondly, whether the conflict will be restricted to Ukraine's borders, or extend into other countries, including possibly NATO nations.
Four scenarios flow from these uncertainties, with the least-positive outcome for most people and organizations being the one that could see the conflict escalate beyond Ukraine, to involve NATO countries, and continue into 2023. Conversely, the least-worst scenario is probably the one where the war remains confined to Ukraine, and ends in 2022. However, even then, there will be very significant impacts going forward.
This latter scenario, which would be an "uneasy peace," is closest to the situation which prevailed before February's invasion of Ukraine, when there were continual tensions with Russia, but no full-on conflict. However, the big difference between then and now is that Moscow's incursion means the Kremlin now holds significant amounts of ground in the country that it appears unlikely to want to return. I
ndeed, some Western intelligence sources say that what the Russian leadership favors is a Korean Peninsula-type outcome with a "new" pro-Moscow state, akin to North Korea, bordering Russia.
If this scenario is borne out, much of the sanctions regime against Russia put in place since February is likely to remain, potentially for years to come. This possibility was highlighted by U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo when he said that the world's biggest companies "have a choice to make" as to whether to "choose to help Russia" or "continue to do business with the 30 plus countries" that have imposed sanctions.
While the post-February sanctions regime therefore appears most likely to remain, one key caveat to this was highlighted by U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss when she said that it could be rolled back if Russia changes course dramatically, possibly after a leadership change.
As much as the last few weeks have been traumatic for Ukrainian people, over 4 million of whom have become refugees, this is by no means the worst-case scenario. That future, which might be called "World War III," is most likely to be realized if the conflict escalates beyond Ukraine, plus continues into 2023. A key question here, in the event that NATO countries become embroiled, is what China's reaction would be ― building from its qualified rhetorical support of Russia so far.
While this scenario still seems unlikely to many, it cannot be dismissed. While NATO is doing what it can to support Ukraine without getting entangled in a direct military confrontation with Russia, miscalculation by one or both sides is a real concern.
The longer the conflict goes on, the greater the risk of a stray Russian missile hitting a NATO country that borders Ukraine, or the taking out of a Western warship or jet. The allies have bolstered their defenses along their eastern flank, meaning that there is a lot more military hardware and personnel in the region, raising the risk of mistakes.
Chillingly, this scenario may also be the most likely to see the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, not only would the sanctions regime grow, there would be a wider international economic collapse, expediting moves toward de-globalization.
An alternative scenario that would also see the conflict continue into 2023 is a "war of attrition." The difference here is that the war would remain within Ukraine's borders, and could see Moscow gain more ground in what may ultimately lead to guerrilla-style combat. While this scenario may not be the worst case, the refugee crisis would deteriorate further, and there could be prolonged economic fallout.
A final scenario, a "new era of superpower tensions," would see the all-out military conflict end in 2022, but nonetheless remain very dangerous in terms of increasingly becoming a proxy war for the great powers. Rather than resulting in a massive conflagration like a "World War III," there would be more of a Cold War-style outcome, in which nations like China provide indirect assistance.
So while this last scenario may be less catastrophic than a "World War III," it would still have a chilling effect on the world economy. It would also bring a definitive end to the geopolitical era which began in the early 1990s with the Soviet Union's collapse.
In reality, the Ukraine conflict's endgames may combine features of all four scenarios. Each of them represents plausible futures that, while unlikely to materialize in exactly the ways outlined, provide a guiding post to the complexity of the future, with the goal of helping better anticipate the changes still to come.
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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