By Kim Sang-woo
After completing a review of potential North Korea policies, the Biden White House has decided that its approach to achieving the denuclearization of North Korea will be different from the previous Obama, and Trump administrations. Since then, the U.S. has consistently conveyed the message that it would meet with the North Koreans "anytime, anywhere, and without preconditions."
However, Pyongyang has been adamant in demanding concessions and the removal of the U.S.'s "hostile policy" first if Washington wants to renew denuclearization talks.
With only a few months left in his presidency, Moon Jae-in is increasingly desperate to establish a legacy of having improved inter-Korean relations. During a speech at the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September, President Moon stated that a declaration to officially end the Korean War would create "a new order of reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula [and] make irreversible progress in denuclearization."
Noh Kyu-duk, the South Korean special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs describes the declaration as a "symbolic" gesture to demonstrate that Seoul and Washington harbor no hostility toward Pyongyang, and to provide momentum to resume dialogue.
Moreover, Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said that Washington "shouldn't be timid in offering North Koreans incentives, including humanitarian assistance and the easing of sanctions." He highlighted that Pyongyang has maintained its moratorium on nuclear weapons and long range missile testing for four years.
It appears, the Moon administration is willing to overlook North Korea's constant violations of U.N. resolutions, and its introduction of new weapon systems that heighten the military tension on the Korean Peninsula.
On Oct. 26, at a press briefing, responding to a question on the declaration to end the Korean War, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the proposal appears to be "productive and constructive," but that the two allies have "different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps."
Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, earlier expressed her interest in Moon's proposal. However, she emphasized that North Korea would not seriously deal with it unless the U.S. made concessions and proved that it has "no hostile" intent toward her country.
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae-song, in a similar tone, said it was too early to declare an end to of war and this would first require ending the presence of U.S. forces "on the Korean Peninsula and its vicinity….and war drills held annually."
Kim Jong-un offered improved inter- Korean relations moving toward "reconciliation and cooperation" but called on Seoul to end its "excessive arms buildup and allied military activities."
South Korean officials are seeking U.S. acceptance for an end-of-war declaration by pointing out that the document would only be symbolic, nonbinding, and without any real effect or consequences. However, they are unable to present any tangible benefits it will provide, nor any changes in North Korean policy or behavior.
A document ending the Korean War that failed to reduce the North Korean military threat would be very dangerous. A proper peace agreement must create conditions that are more conducive to peace than the armistice which it would replace. A viable peace agreement should not only end the existing hostilities, but also prevent another war.
A recent poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on U.S. public opinion toward North Korea showed 76 percent of Americans support a Korean peace agreement, but only if North Korea suspends its nuclear program. Only 24 percent supported a peace agreement with a nuclear North Korea.
The results suggest that the U.S. should keep the door open to negotiations with North Korea, but there is little political incentive to make additional concessions or to sign onto South Korea's end-of-war declaration proposal in the absence of a North Korean commitment on denuclearization.
Interestingly, in South Korea, an extensive annual survey of South Korean views on unification conducted in July by the Korea Institute of National Unification shows that South Korea's younger generation desires peaceful coexistence with the North, but are disinterested in the unification of the two Koreas. The survey results reveal both deepening disinterest in North Korea and skepticism that denuclearization is possible.
It also suggests widespread public support for an alliance based approach to North Korea. Whatever tactical efforts North Korea might make to take advantage of the Moon administration's desire to establish inter-Korean peace and cooperation will only be sustainable if Moon is able to win the support of the U.S.
Taken together, public opinion in both countries on North Korea policy shows a strong degree of consensus. It is likely that this will be the basis for continued U.S.-South Korea policy coordination toward the North regardless of who wins in the March 9 presidential election in the South; and also sends a clear message to president Moon that the public do not favor his over-zealous desire to push through his end-of-war declaration at the cost of acquiescing to the outrageous demands of Pyongyang.
Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com) is a former lawmaker and is currently chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.
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However, Pyongyang has been adamant in demanding concessions and the removal of the U.S.'s "hostile policy" first if Washington wants to renew denuclearization talks.
With only a few months left in his presidency, Moon Jae-in is increasingly desperate to establish a legacy of having improved inter-Korean relations. During a speech at the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September, President Moon stated that a declaration to officially end the Korean War would create "a new order of reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula [and] make irreversible progress in denuclearization."
Noh Kyu-duk, the South Korean special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs describes the declaration as a "symbolic" gesture to demonstrate that Seoul and Washington harbor no hostility toward Pyongyang, and to provide momentum to resume dialogue.
Moreover, Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said that Washington "shouldn't be timid in offering North Koreans incentives, including humanitarian assistance and the easing of sanctions." He highlighted that Pyongyang has maintained its moratorium on nuclear weapons and long range missile testing for four years.
It appears, the Moon administration is willing to overlook North Korea's constant violations of U.N. resolutions, and its introduction of new weapon systems that heighten the military tension on the Korean Peninsula.
On Oct. 26, at a press briefing, responding to a question on the declaration to end the Korean War, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the proposal appears to be "productive and constructive," but that the two allies have "different perspectives on the precise sequence or timing or conditions for different steps."
Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, earlier expressed her interest in Moon's proposal. However, she emphasized that North Korea would not seriously deal with it unless the U.S. made concessions and proved that it has "no hostile" intent toward her country.
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae-song, in a similar tone, said it was too early to declare an end to of war and this would first require ending the presence of U.S. forces "on the Korean Peninsula and its vicinity….and war drills held annually."
Kim Jong-un offered improved inter- Korean relations moving toward "reconciliation and cooperation" but called on Seoul to end its "excessive arms buildup and allied military activities."
South Korean officials are seeking U.S. acceptance for an end-of-war declaration by pointing out that the document would only be symbolic, nonbinding, and without any real effect or consequences. However, they are unable to present any tangible benefits it will provide, nor any changes in North Korean policy or behavior.
A document ending the Korean War that failed to reduce the North Korean military threat would be very dangerous. A proper peace agreement must create conditions that are more conducive to peace than the armistice which it would replace. A viable peace agreement should not only end the existing hostilities, but also prevent another war.
A recent poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on U.S. public opinion toward North Korea showed 76 percent of Americans support a Korean peace agreement, but only if North Korea suspends its nuclear program. Only 24 percent supported a peace agreement with a nuclear North Korea.
The results suggest that the U.S. should keep the door open to negotiations with North Korea, but there is little political incentive to make additional concessions or to sign onto South Korea's end-of-war declaration proposal in the absence of a North Korean commitment on denuclearization.
Interestingly, in South Korea, an extensive annual survey of South Korean views on unification conducted in July by the Korea Institute of National Unification shows that South Korea's younger generation desires peaceful coexistence with the North, but are disinterested in the unification of the two Koreas. The survey results reveal both deepening disinterest in North Korea and skepticism that denuclearization is possible.
It also suggests widespread public support for an alliance based approach to North Korea. Whatever tactical efforts North Korea might make to take advantage of the Moon administration's desire to establish inter-Korean peace and cooperation will only be sustainable if Moon is able to win the support of the U.S.
Taken together, public opinion in both countries on North Korea policy shows a strong degree of consensus. It is likely that this will be the basis for continued U.S.-South Korea policy coordination toward the North regardless of who wins in the March 9 presidential election in the South; and also sends a clear message to president Moon that the public do not favor his over-zealous desire to push through his end-of-war declaration at the cost of acquiescing to the outrageous demands of Pyongyang.
Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com) is a former lawmaker and is currently chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.
