Seoul can ill afford to suppress rising calls
There have been continued calls for the nation to acquire nuclear weapons to defend itself against North Korea, which recently conducted an alleged H-bomb test after three atomic bomb detonations. Including its markedly improved delivery systems, showcased by its Feb. 7 rocket launch, Pyongyang is seen to be close to becoming a virtual nuclear weapons state.
Nuclear weapons are asymmetric tools of war, meaning they nullify superiority in conventional weapons; and therefore the only means to counter them is to have the same capability.
There is no doubt that the Kim Jong-un regime, once its nuclear weapons are deployed, would threaten the South with a reign of nuclear terror. To avoid that terrible scenario, it is only natural to consider what nuclear options are available. There should be an open, unrestricted discussion about pros and cons, rather than treat it as taboo and shy away.
Although President Park Geun-hye didn't make an overt reference during her speech at the National Assembly, Tuesday, she indeed talked about the need to thwart the North's effort to perfect its nuclear arsenal for the same reason why ordinary people feel the need for nuclear arms ― not to live in the fear of nuclear blackmail by the North. Also, ruling Saenuri Party floor leader Won Yoo-chul laid out his case for acquiring nukes at the Assembly, followed by a suggestion from the party for the revision of the current Korea-U.S. nuclear pact in order to enable nuclear material reprocessing for bomb-making fissile material. It is said that Seoul is two years from making atomic bombs, if the restrictions are lifted.
True, different from the pariah state, North Korea, Seoul is a responsible member of the international community, fulfilling such obligations as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which allows five nations ― the U.S., China, Russia, Britain and France ― as nuclear states and penalizes any violators. Also the South faithfully puts itself under the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The North quit the NPT and kicked out IAEA monitors.
In short, going nuclear would be costly. But the North's nuclear weapons puts us in an existential peril so we may not allow somebody else to make the decision for us. In that sense, perhaps, now is time to start a meaningful, wide-ranging dialogue.
For two other important reasons, such a dialogue can prove to be practical. First, it would put other countries, namely China, on notice, forcing it to think of its protectionist embrace of its naughty client, the North, even at the cost of a nuclear domino affecting the South and Japan.
Secondly, it would lead to the realignment of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The South has refrained from nuclear development in return for the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The extended deterrence was only good when it was up against the now defunct Soviet Union on the so-called mutually assured destruction (MAD). Now the question is whether U.S. guarantees of nuclear deterrence would be used to protect the South, when the North, which has an incomparably small arsenal, hurls nuclear-tipped missiles toward the South and no U.S. casualties take place.
These and other possibilities should be dealt with as promptly and urgently as our effort to force the North to give up its nuclear arsenal. The nation can ill afford to shy away from exploration of all possible venues to strengthen and widen our means of self-defense. The likelihood is that we will regret any delay as we are over our failure to stop the North from its nuclear and missile development over the last 10 to 20 years.
There have been continued calls for the nation to acquire nuclear weapons to defend itself against North Korea, which recently conducted an alleged H-bomb test after three atomic bomb detonations. Including its markedly improved delivery systems, showcased by its Feb. 7 rocket launch, Pyongyang is seen to be close to becoming a virtual nuclear weapons state.
Nuclear weapons are asymmetric tools of war, meaning they nullify superiority in conventional weapons; and therefore the only means to counter them is to have the same capability.
There is no doubt that the Kim Jong-un regime, once its nuclear weapons are deployed, would threaten the South with a reign of nuclear terror. To avoid that terrible scenario, it is only natural to consider what nuclear options are available. There should be an open, unrestricted discussion about pros and cons, rather than treat it as taboo and shy away.
Although President Park Geun-hye didn't make an overt reference during her speech at the National Assembly, Tuesday, she indeed talked about the need to thwart the North's effort to perfect its nuclear arsenal for the same reason why ordinary people feel the need for nuclear arms ― not to live in the fear of nuclear blackmail by the North. Also, ruling Saenuri Party floor leader Won Yoo-chul laid out his case for acquiring nukes at the Assembly, followed by a suggestion from the party for the revision of the current Korea-U.S. nuclear pact in order to enable nuclear material reprocessing for bomb-making fissile material. It is said that Seoul is two years from making atomic bombs, if the restrictions are lifted.
True, different from the pariah state, North Korea, Seoul is a responsible member of the international community, fulfilling such obligations as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which allows five nations ― the U.S., China, Russia, Britain and France ― as nuclear states and penalizes any violators. Also the South faithfully puts itself under the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The North quit the NPT and kicked out IAEA monitors.
In short, going nuclear would be costly. But the North's nuclear weapons puts us in an existential peril so we may not allow somebody else to make the decision for us. In that sense, perhaps, now is time to start a meaningful, wide-ranging dialogue.
For two other important reasons, such a dialogue can prove to be practical. First, it would put other countries, namely China, on notice, forcing it to think of its protectionist embrace of its naughty client, the North, even at the cost of a nuclear domino affecting the South and Japan.
Secondly, it would lead to the realignment of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The South has refrained from nuclear development in return for the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The extended deterrence was only good when it was up against the now defunct Soviet Union on the so-called mutually assured destruction (MAD). Now the question is whether U.S. guarantees of nuclear deterrence would be used to protect the South, when the North, which has an incomparably small arsenal, hurls nuclear-tipped missiles toward the South and no U.S. casualties take place.
These and other possibilities should be dealt with as promptly and urgently as our effort to force the North to give up its nuclear arsenal. The nation can ill afford to shy away from exploration of all possible venues to strengthen and widen our means of self-defense. The likelihood is that we will regret any delay as we are over our failure to stop the North from its nuclear and missile development over the last 10 to 20 years.
