By Tong Kim
It was predictable that North Korea would, and it did, turn down President Lee Myung-bak’s offer of a conditional invitation to Kim Jong-il to attend the next Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to be hosted by Seoul in March 2012. The conditions required Pyongyang to make a ``firm and sincere” commitment to denuclearization credible to the international community and to apologize for its attacks last year on a South Korean warship and Yeonpyeong Island.
Regarding the first part of the conditions, Pyongyang had made commitments to denuclearization in 1991, 1994 and 2005, but the commitments were carried out only partially before the North publicly discarded them in 2009. There is plenty of blame to go around for the failure in the implementation of the agreements for denuclearization. North Korea still says it maintains the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. It says it is willing to negotiate conditions for denuclearization. But, Pyongyang’s intent has always been questioned, largely because of its own behavior.
Recently, the North Korean leader said in a written message to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, ``He was willing to meet with President Lee anytime to discuss any issues, and to negotiate with South Korea, the United States and any other participant of the six-party talks anytime on any issues without any preconditions.”
Before Carter’s visit to Pyongyang, it was unpredictable whether Chairman Kim Jong would meet the former American leader, and only after no meeting had taken place, came speculations for the reasons why Kim did not see Carter. The most interesting version of speculation was that Kim avoided meeting Carter because of his memory that his father Kim Il-sung died only a month after meeting with Carter in 1994. Superstition has deep roots in traditional Korean culture.
However, Kim’s message was not taken serious enough to show the ``seriousness” of Pyongyang’s commitment to denuclearization that Seoul and Washington was demanding Pyongyang to demonstrate by action beyond words. The North Korean format of delivery of the message was out of normal diplomatic protocol, and therefore the message could be taken less seriously, but it was not out of Pyongyang’s practice.
On many occasions, President Lee has repeated his conditional willingness to meet with his North Korean counterparts, ``if North Korea is serious and sincere” to denuclearize itself and to do the right thing for the common interest of the Korean nation. In a joint pursuance of North Korea’s ``sincerity,” neither Seoul nor Washington has yet laid out specific measures or actions for the North to take to prove its ``sincerity.”
Pyongyang’s rejection of the second part of President Lee’s condition that the North must first apologize for the two attacks on the West Sea ``as a minimum basis for sincerity,” was more clearly predictable. According to Carter, the North Korean military was deeply regretful of the loss of lives, including civilians, but expressed no apology or responsibility for the tragedies.
It is predictable that the North would keep insisting that it had no part in the sinking of the naval ship, but it is unpredictable that the North would take some responsibility for the Yeonpyeong incident, as it cannot and does not deny its role in a deadly exchange of artillery over the island.
There is no proof that the South Korean President made the invitation offer, knowing that it would be quickly rejected. In view of the recent peace offensives by the North for dialogue and negotiations with the South and the United States, Seoul’s invitation offer to Kim may have been intended to serve as a counter offensive, not as a serious proposal. If this were the case, it would look like tit for tat.
However, it would probably be unlikely for Kim to come to Seoul even if the invitation was free of conditions. He never made the return visit to Seoul that he promised in the joint declaration of June 15, 2000, and he declined an invitation by President Bill Clinton to come to Washington in January 2001. He would probably send Kim Yong-nam, the nominal head of the DPRK, to the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.
When former President Kim Dae-jung announced the Berlin Declaration in March 2000, in which he offered South Korea’s economic assistance to the North, Seoul had advanced the points of its proposal to Pyongyang and Washington to demonstrate Seoul’s seriousness. There were reports on the Lee government’s consultation with Washington regarding the invitation. Seoul does not seem to have alerted Pyongyang of its announcement in Berlin.
The idea of inviting North Korea that has a nuclear arsenal with the addition of a uranium enrichment program to the next NSS makes sense. It could help achieve the purpose of the NSS ― to prevent nuclear terrorism by improving the security of nuclear materials scattered around the world. Since the aftermath of the Fukushima meltdown, the safety of power-generating atomic reactors is expected to be part of the agenda for the next NSS. The scientific community has voiced concerns about the safety levels for the North Korean nuclear facilities, including a uranium enrichment plant now under construction.
Given the predictable reality that the denuclearization of North Korea would take a long time, probably years, even after it makes a strategic decision to do so, the North should be persuaded to cooperate with the international community to strengthen the safety and security of its nuclear materials and facilities.
Inviting the North should not in any way mean to accept it as a nuclear state by the international community. While the North is a de facto nuclear state, it should be treated as a country in the process of denuclearization. The North knows no neighboring country supports its nuclear status. At the same time, it is important to address security concerns of the North if denuclearization is to succeed.
Both the North and South accuse each other of lacking ``sincerity” to improve mutual relations and to resolve such important issues of nuclear weapons and prevention of provocations that threaten the security in the peninsula. Beyond the issue of responsibility for the sinking of the frigate Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, and beyond the rhetoric of ``genuine dialogue,” there is a more fundamental question, which needs to be resolved between both sides. That is total distrust between them.
It is predictable that as long as mutual distrust and disdain continues between the Kim Jong-il regime and the Lee government, there would be no meaningful progress in their relations while they are in power. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.