By Tong Kim
It is the Christmas holiday season and time to wish for ``peace on earth, good will toward men.” But, the leaders of both Koreas are shunning this holy message for human aspiration.
The South vows a ``merciless counterattack” against the North if its territory is attacked again. The atheistic North threatens to wage ``a holy war” with its nuclear capability against its southern neighbor.
Apart from rhetoric, it was a relief that the North did not attack the South again in reaction to a live-fire drill on Yeonpyeong Island by the South Korean forces on Dec. 20. The North only responded by a statement that it was not worth it to “retaliate against every despicable military provocation,” yet threatening a second and third strike, “knowing no limit to blow up” the bases of the U.S. and the South Korean warmongers.” South Korea carried out even a larger-scale joint live strike exercise at Pocheon not far from the DMZ on Dec. 23, which prompted the North Korean defense minister, Kim Young-chun, to warn of a nuclear all-out war.
Why did the North shift to a war of rhetoric instead of resorting to firing again? It appears to be North Korea’s temporary strategic decision, which might be attributed to a number of influence factors, which includes: (1) the determined ROK’s readiness to retaliate with U.S. endorsement, (2) China’s reigning in the North from escalation, (3) Kim Jong-il’s judgment that he had stirred up enough trouble for now, while calculating the next move, and (4) New Mexico governor Bill Richardson’s alleged impact.
From the two major deadly incidents ― the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling ― the North is not known to have suffered physical damage beyond political condemnation. South Korea’s belated fire drills were symbolic protestations against the provocations and were designed to demonstrate its resolve to retaliate future provocation and its readiness to fight a major war with the North, if necessary. However, South Korea’s fire drills have caused no damages to the North. From Kim Jong-il’s point of view, he has successfully brought international attention to the issue of the Northern Limit Line as an unsettled source of dispute.
Based on an observation of recent developments, China appeared more concerned or scared of escalation of tensions lest it should trigger a wider war on the Korean Peninsula. China’s state councilor Dai Bingguo’s meeting with President Lee Myung-bak ended with no results. What impact his ensuing meeting with Kim Jong-il had had was not clearly known. Nevertheless, Dai Bingguo must have tried to restrain Kim.
The U.S. endorsement of the South Korean fire drills, with the participation of a nominal UNC representation and a small U.S. medical and communications team, was cautiously handled from the beginning, guarding against possible escalation. The United States emphasized that the ROK drills were defensive in nature and therefore the North must not respond with fire. The U.S. ambassador to Seoul and the commander of the U.S. forces in Korea visited the Blue House reportedly to convey U.S. concerns about the fire drill, but they were not allowed to see President Lee. Instead, they only met with Lee’s national security advisor, and the Blue House spokeswoman later said that the purpose of their visit was to express U.S. support for South Korea’s action in self-defense.
At the end, the North’s restraint from launching another attack was a payoff from a big gamble, in which there was no guarantee for winning, other than the assumption that North Korea cannot afford to start a war. This view is widely shared by people working in government or private think tanks in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. Yet, most of the same people are predicting more provocations to come from the North later ― most likely in another form of asymmetric attack, or by a new missile launch or a third nuclear test within the next four to six months.
Everybody agrees that the South should strengthen its readiness to counter further North Korean provocation. Enhancement of combat capabilities by fielding more equipment and by conducting military exercises certainly has a deterrent effect in the sense that the enemy would be defeated if the deterrent fails. But it also contributes to escalation of confrontation and a resource-draining arms race, while failing to assure the prevention of limited, calculated provocation, unless other leverages ― political or economic ― are available.
Washington’s do-nothing policy of ``strategic patience,” as well as Seoul’s hard-line ``principled” policy of confrontation, has failed to change North Korean behavior. Washington only encouraged the North to behave more provocatively, while keeping its distance from it. The North Korean regime has not collapsed. There is no scientific evidence of when or even whether the North will collapse. This is not to say that the South should not prepare for such an event.
The problem with Pyongyang’s credibility or its flip-flap tactics is nothing new. True, the North Koreans often fail to keep their word. They sometimes do things that they said they would not do. They sometimes do things they said they would do. It is not easy to predict what they would do. Yet, it would require the art of diplomacy to capture the pragmatic nature of their behavior to make them committed to and carry out what is in the best interests of the United States and South Korea, as well as other concerned parties in the region. North Korea is not the same horse any more. The horse has become bigger and is getting out of control.
War is not an option. The status quo ― of the situation with a belligerent, nuclear North Korea in a high state of all-out confrontation with the South ― is too costly for both Koreas. The South would be freer to concentrate on its economic growth and other domestic agenda, if it is freed from the burden of watching the North as seriously as it does today. There is no evidence supporting the widely-accepted assumption that the recent provocations are directly related to the elevation of Kim Jong-un as the next leader. On the contrary, several refugee sources claim that North Korean people are scared about a war that the inexperienced young leader is about to start. If this is true, it would not be helpful to the succession process.
Before removing probable causes of future provocations, the question of the NLL must be settled first ― either directly between the North and South or even by an international arbitration. The South has long regarded the NLL as the fixed borderline between the two sides. It would be politically impossible for the South to make any concession on the NLL. One solution would be going back to Roh Moo-hyun’s idea of establishing ``a common fishing zone.”
The cost of continuing confrontation would be unbearably high. Limited resources could be used for peace and prosperity instead of military buildup, if hostility is removed. “Peace on Earth!” What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.