By Heo Mane
It was reported that North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear activities, including a moratorium on tests and long-range missile launches during bilateral talks with the U.S. in Beijing in late February. This announcement was made rather quickly and in a hectic manner, just after Kim Jong-il’s sudden death last December.
The decision was made apparently in return for a package of 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance. State Department spokesman Victor said that North Korea has also agreed to invite inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify and monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment and confirm disablement of its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
Nevertheless, in my eyes, this action appears fundamentally lack confidence and sincerity. It was done too swiftly and with clumsy hands. Do you fully believe that the reclusive Pyongyang regime will trade its nuclear ambitions with the U.S. offer of food aid? If yes, will the regime be willingly ready to downgrade its national security capability simply with this offer? Do you believe that the regime is going to abandon the strategy to realize a peace treaty that it has long sought since the beginning of the 1980s?
I would like to remind you of the historic agreement, the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, which aimed at stopping all nuclear activities at Yongbyon in return for the package of 500,000 tons of heavy oil by the U.S. Substantially, the agreement had the important goal to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by replacing North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors by 2003. In this framework, the North agreed to comply with all international nuclear non-proliferation agreements and to eventually renounce its program to produce nuclear warheads with plutonium.
But the North failed to abide by all agreements. The agreed framework was nullified almost immediately. It turned out a great farce that the Clinton administration had believed that the North would trade its national security for the heavy oil supply. To put it another way, this approach amounts to senseless nuclear diplomacy by the administration toward the secretive communist state.
North Korea is still in precariously transitional period from the late Kim Jong-il’s era to his son, Kim Jon-un, the present leader. The “juche (self-reliance) philosophy-oriented communist state is in desperate need of foreign currency and food to prepare for the centennial birthday of the late Kim Il-sung. The cash-strapped regime now is in a situation to carry out the pompous event as scheduled and eventually to come closer to a “militarily power first policy” by the end of 2012.
Moreover, Kim Jong-un might realize that Libya’s Gadhafi regime collapsed after it was forced to abandon the production of nuclear weapons, while Pakistan, India and Israel survive as independent states. Thus Kim Jon-un will not easily give up the nuclear program. His newly-born regime apparently needs to enhance the welfare of his military, with a view to stabilizing his political power base. These motivations seem to have tempted the Pyongyang regime to strike a deal of nutritional aid for temporarily halting the nuclear activities at Yongbyon.
However, we have already found that this agreement has some skeptical points when it was separately announced in Washington and Pyongyang. Both parties interpreted it differently on the halting of uranium enrichment program. In addition, we don’t understand why the plutonium development program was deliberately avoided in the agreement. Viewing it from this standpoint, the temporary halting was designed to get food aid and eventually stabilize the domestic political and economic situations. I don’t think that in forthcoming dialogue this action will help the six-party talks to realize denuclearization as long expected. It is not a significant outcome.
What preconditions should then precede at this critical juncture? First and foremost, South Koreans must create a consensus on the national security policy. In particular, both the Saenuri Party and the Democratic United Party, with other minor political parties should show their common stand on national security concerning Pyongyang’s dubious deal with the Obama administration. A different stand can easily damage, to a greater extent, the country’s national security framework and capability. Second, North Korea needs to improve relations with its direct partner, South Korea. The country aims to isolate South Korea or reduce its voice as much as possible in the multilateral nuclear talks.
The denuclearization issue directly concerns the people of both sides ― their present and future destiny, rather than that of the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. Thus, the two Koreas must meet face-to-face soon to find a negotiated solution to this matter. They ought to maximize their wisdom to realize this job by minimizing the outside powers’ intervention. After all, the nuclear problem of North Korea can possibly be “Koreanized.”
Inter-Korean dialogue is, among other things, considered essential to achieve denuclearization of the peninsula.
Both sides must take the initiative in furthering this task, which is the pillar for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Third, Pyongyang should take action to invite IAEA inspectors to let them verify all nuclear activities including uranium enrichment program and the present state and whereabouts of spent fuels at Yongyon.
Fourth, food aid must be synchronized with Pyongyang’s action, for which the European Union is virtually required to observe the verification processes. The EU has been very much interested in maintaining security on the peninsula. It concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with South Korea in 2011, the first of its kind in Asia.
The Lee Myung-bak government must step up its efforts for bringing about a significant outcome through Korea-EU special channels. It must make the most of the European powerful actor in effectuating the long drawn-out denuclearization. The U.N. Security Council is not likely to send its observation team because of possible use of veto power by China and Russia. In recent years, it has been paralyzed due to the frequent use of their vetoes. Lastly, China as G2 and Russia as G20 must help this serious matter to bear fruit soon for lasting peace and stability in this part of the world. This means that they are de facto important international actors to influence world affairs.
The more nuclear weapons proliferate, the more insecure the world will be. The less they proliferate, the more secure it will be. Peace and security entirely rely on this formula. In a nutshell, the six parties with the EU’s participation are expected to make meaningful progress on this matter, once the multinational nuclear talks resume.
The writer is president of the Korea-EU Forum. Contact him at mane398@naver.com.