By Tong Kim
The current state of inter-Korean relations seems to be at its lowest ebb in a decade.
Last week in Beijing, athletes from the two Koreas marched separately in the Olympics opening ceremony. It broke the symbolic tradition of participating in Olympic ceremonies as a unified team under a single ``unification flag" representing both sides in hopes of eventual unification. The separation marked a clear setback for peace and harmony.
North Korea's nominal head of state Kim Young-nam tried to avoid being at the same table as South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. During the lunch Lee approached Kim and there was an awkward handshake, but they did not exchange smiles or words.
During his visit to Seoul, U.S. President George W. Bush made it clear that North Korea would remain a part of the ``axis of evil'' until it gives up its nuclear programs and that it would not be removed from the list of states sponsoring terrorism unless the North Korean leader agrees to a verification regime that can be trusted.
A joint summit statement linked ``meaningful progress on North Korea's human rights record'' to the process of normalizing U.S.-DPRK relations. Bush said, ``human rights abuses still exist and persist'' in North Korea. He also supported Seoul's request to investigate the killing of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Geumgang.
While keeping silence on Bush's comments, Pyongyang showed its reaction: it rejected the U.S. human rights envoy's plan to visit the Gaeseong industrial park. North Korean authorities announced they would expel South Korean personnel from the tourist zone in the mountain after flatly rejecting the South's demand for an investigation of the shooting. This decision was made with Kim Jong-il's approval.
The North Koreans seem determined not to talk to the Korean government ― which refuses to recognize the positive aspects of engagement during the periods of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. President Lee does not want to go back to the business as usual, but he still wants to have ``genuine dialogue'' to correct what he perceives as having gone wrong.
Last week's U.S.-ROK summit, the third since Lee became president certainly demonstrated the strong ties between the two traditional allies, pledging close cooperation on issues of denuclearization and North Korean human rights. It seems to have dispelled some concerns in South Korean politics that Seoul might be sidelined into irrelevance as Pyongyang focuses on working only with Washington.
The North Koreans, like Chinese authorities, insist that the human rights issue is an internal affair, and one in which no outsiders should interfere. After Bush's visit, the North Korean policy makers, including foreign ministry and military leaders, are probably going through an internal debate, analyzing Bush's conditions for removing their country from the terrorism list as well as his renewed emphasis on human rights and his revived reference to North Korea as part of the axis of evil.
Bush says North Korea will have better relations with the five participants in the nuclear talks if and when Kim Jong-il verifiably gives up his nuclear weapons program. Bush does not know whether Kim Jong-il will give up his weapons. And Kim Jong-il does not know whether Bush will trade normalization for denuclearization in the formula of ``action for action" at the end. Yet, Kim may again delay the process but he will not destroy it, because the stakes are too high.
President Bush will leave office in five months, President Lee in five and a half years, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in 15 years or more if he lives until 82 like his father. Their legacies will impact the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Of the three key actors, Bush's legacy is quite predictable at this juncture.
Bush will not see complete, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, nor will he leave a ``more normal bilateral relationship" with the DPRK or an improved human rights situation in the North, not to mention a Korean Peninsula peace arrangement or a security cooperative system for the Northeast region, which is envisioned as an ideal spin-off goal of the six- party talks.
For Bush's legacy on North Korea, he will have accomplished phase two of nuclear talks that successfully stopped Kim Jong-il from increasing fissile materials to make more bombs by disabling the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, while sticking to his conviction on human rights and freedom. That would not be a bad record for history. By the time he came to Seoul, he was probably conscious of the seemingly insurmountable hurdles lying ahead ― and his waning power at home and abroad.
When Bush leaves, the basic formula of the multilateral process is almost certain to stay in place, although there would be some modifications to approaches, depending on who will be the next president of the United States. If Barack Obama ― who said he would meet with leaders like Kim Jong-il ― is elected and control of Congress remains in the hands of the Democrats, there would probably be more active ``realist" negotiations with North Korea. If John McCain is elected, his administration is likely to stay the course set by the Bush administration, although it might be tougher in rhetoric in pursuit of the same goal.
Before Bush leaves, it is highly unlikely that the worsening tension between the two Koreas would be mitigated, unless either Lee or Kim Jong-il makes a bold decision. For the foreseeable future, the absence of government-level contacts between the North and the South would continue. Both sides will continue spending more scarce resources on military buildup, blaming each other, and further intensifying the already heightened tension.
It should be reminded that pressure does not work on North Korea ― it can only backfire. The North Koreans will not listen to the United States if the latter tries to encourage the former to resume dialogue and cooperate with South Korea, a lesson from the Clinton administration's experience during the period of Kim Young-sam. Bush's help is limited when it comes to the matter of inter-Korean relations. It's up to Lee Myung-bak and Kim Jong-il to determine whether to improve their relations.
Inasmuch as the Dokdo issue is an issue between South Korea and Japan, in which the United States should not be involved, the issue of inter-Korean relations is for Koreans on both sides to resolve.
Prolonged estrangement between the North and the South is not good for either side. The North should not go back to the days of cold war confrontation, and the South should think of the investment it has made in peace and cooperation with the North over the past decade. Both should seek a breakthrough to the state of denial. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.