By Tong Kim
WASHINGTON ― I am writing this column before President Lee Myung-bak leaves for Camp David on the afternoon of April 19, Washington time. His visit is already a huge success. His priority on strengthening and expanding Korea's ties with the United States was greatly welcomed by Washington before Lee's arrival here. No doubt, his summit with President Bush will be one of the most successful U.S.-Korea summits, probably the most successful in terms of symbolism.
In summitry, symbolism is important, although it does not always translate into practical interest to either side. Symbolism is often demonstrated by diplomatic protocols, which in the case of Bush's practice includes hosting a summit at Camp David or at Crawford and other choreographed, friendly gestures for a warm welcome and an exchange of pleasantries.
Symbolism can serve as a building block for serious dialogue to pursue shared goals between allies and even adversaries. It seems to take this kind of symbolism to rebuild the trust between the United States and Korea, that had been damaged largely due to disagreement over North Korea.
Lee and Bush share a similar view of the North. No surprises are expected at the Saturday summit. A documented assurance of a visa waver program for Korea is a small but tangible gift, along with business investment pledges that President Lee can hand carry home.
But in terms of practical interest, what President Lee takes home other than symbolism will be a subject of discussion subsequent to the summit. Summit press statements will not disagree on how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue or how to strengthen and transform the bilateral security alliance.
The two leaders will press for Congressional ratification of the free trade agreement recently signed by both countries, knowing there are no votes for ratification. Seoul's removal of the restrictions on beef import from the United States would not be enough to surmount American election politics.
On North Korea, the Bush administration has shown its eagerness to move on with the denuclearization process even though it is not satisfied with North Korea's failure to present a ``complete and correct'' declaration, and the pragmatic hardliner Korean president does not seem to oppose the U.S. backing down on the issues of uranium enrichment and proliferation.
On alliance transformation, there are some difficult issues facing the pro-American Korean president ― U.S. pressure on him to re-dispatch Korean troops to Afghanistan: only four months ago, Korean troops withdrew from the troubled spot as a condition for the release of Korean hostages from a Taliban group. Other issues include the cost sharing of the relocation and operation of U.S. forces in Korea, Korea's participation in PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) and building a missile defense system that could send the wrong message to China.
There is no known factual basis to link talks of a U.S. plan to freeze the current level of U.S. troops at 28,500 ― suspending the agreed plan to withdraw 3,500 troops by the end of 2008 ― to a U.S. request for South Korea's troop redeployment to Afghanistan.
The Lee government is publicly committed to contributing more to global security and humanitarian issues. Building a ``strategic alliance'' may require rendering assistance to address U.S. concerns on global issues. President Lee, who seems to dislike politics, should be mindful of reactions from his domestic constituents if he considers the redeployment of troops.
The concept of President Lee's ``strategic alliance'' was nebulous and confusing at the beginning and ``restoration of the alliance'' was a misnomer. A ``strategic alliance'' was a term that was more widely used in business to achieve agreed goals while maintaining separate entities. The Clinton administration tried to build a ``strategic partnership'' with China. In the ROK-U.S. bilateral context, a ``strategic alliance'' gave an impression of backtracking.
In New York, the president said the strategic alliance would be based on value, trust and peace. According to his aides, the new relationship aims at long-term sustainability, comprehensiveness, enhanced capability and priority setting _ expanding the alliance to trade, economy, culture and education. It would be safe to think that a ``strategic alliance'' goes beyond the traditional concept of a security alliance.
Inasmuch as North Korea was the cause of the ROK-U.S. alliance, no U.S.-Korea summit has excluded a discussion of North Korea. Both Bush and Lee prefer a ``denuclearization first policy'' before providing benefits to North Korea. They support a linkage approach that predicates rewards on denuclearization in contrast to the ``parallel approach'' that President Lee's predecessors had pursued to achieve both denuclearization and improved inter-Korean relations. At this point of nuclear progress, many are not sure who is more hawkish or pragmatic, Bush or Lee.
While in Washington, Lee sent some positive messages to Pyongyang ― showing his interest in reengaging North Korea through his interviews with The Washington Post and CNN and his meetings with some prominent Americans. His proposal for an exchange of liaison offices in both Koreas, although unlikely to take place, along with his willingness to talk to the North Korean leader as a ``negotiating partner who can made a big decision'' is an extension of an olive branch.
Common sense would dictate that the North Koreans should grapple with Lee's offer for ``a genuine'' dialogue for peace and prosperity. The North is unlikely to positively respond to the new proposal, still resentful at the misdirected rhetoric from the South and given a pathological sense of pride that it would not easily give up.
Using the American media to channel the message might raise suspicions of seriousness by the North Koreans, who might think the message is directed at American audiences.
President Lee and his policy team now seem to have a clearer and more realistic idea of how to deal with the North. Separation of humanitarian assistance from economic aid contingent upon progress in (and not completion of) denuclearization, is indeed a ``pragmatic'' approach to the North Korean issue.
Inter-Korean dialogue is too important to wait until after complete denuclearization. It is quite possible to make more progress in nuclear negotiations during the remainder of the Bush administration even up to the point of agreement on how to dismantle the North's nuclear facilities and how to dispose of the plutonium with which the North could make several bombs.
However, unless the North is convinced that it would get a worse deal from the next U.S. president, it has no incentive to complete the process as President Bush wishes. For President Lee, there will be plenty of time to work with the United States and to build improved relations with an eventually non-nuclear North Korea. What's your take?
Tong Kim is former senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department and now a research professor with Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com