By Oh Young-jin
Assistant Managing Editor
Let's skip the ``I-told-you-so'' part. But a lesson that U.S. President Barack Obama should learn from North Korea's rocket launch is that there is a need to readjust priorities concerning his nonproliferation policy.
Obama is focused on Iran, its belligerent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mullahs and their nuclear program at a crude stage.
It is understandable, considering Iran's proximity to the Middle East, one of the key U.S. strategic centers for its oil reserves, and Israel. But if Obama puts as much importance as he said during his trip to Prague, Czech Republic on the prevention of the spread ― and the reduction ― of nuclear technologies and weapons, then his job should start with North Korea.
First, Pyongyang has tested its nuclear device, a stage that Tehran has yet to reach. Kim Jong-il, the stroke-stricken leader of the Stalinist state, also possesses technologies to build a rocket that is capable of being developed into an inter-continental missile. This is something Tehran is eager to acquire. Besides Iran, there are other ``buyer'' nations who would do just about anything to acquire the technologies Pyongyang has in its possession.
So, it is not Iran or Syria, but the North that Obama must first address.
If the North Korean problem is cleared, it would give him more time and a wider set of options with which to deal with the nuclear ambitions of the other rogue states.
Dealing with Pyongyang, however, requires more than a little finesse. But jacking up the level of vitriol as he did in Prague doesn't work _ for two reasons. First, the North knows well the limitations of any assertive U.S. policy. China _ now threatening to rival the U.S. status of being the sole world superpower ― and Russia never fail to back Kim Jong-il, whenever the dictator with a gravity-defying puffy hairdo with a sunken potbelly is in danger.
Not even a decent package of sanctions has a working chance of being endorsed by the U.N. Security Council with its permanent members, including the North's two allies, not to mention military action.
At the same time, any bellicose rhetoric is bound to haunt and hobble Obama in his sphere of action later.
For an example, he doesn't need to look beyond his predecessor George W. Bush to see my point.
At an early stage of his presidency, Bush called North Korea part of an ``axis of evil.'' The two other members are Iraq and Iran. Iraq has been Bush's worst nightmare since the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, draining not just its material wealth but also sucking the blood of young Americans. Iran's ayatollahs are up in arms against Washington. They call the shots, no matter how much outside observers wishfully think the alienation of its younger generations from its religious leadership can lead to a debacle.
Bush unilaterally nullified pacts the Clinton administration made with Pyongyang to keep the lid on its nuclear programs. Then he wasted the first five years of his two-term, eight-year presidency on a hodgepodge of indifference, tough talk and attempted sanctions. It was only during the dusk of his presidency that Bush turned around his anti-Pyongyang policy and tried to engage the North. By then, his supporters felt betrayed at the sudden flip-flop of his policy, leaving him with little political capital to push ahead with his new North Korea policy.
So what can Obama do to escape from a repeat of the Bush precedent, defuse the North Korean nuclear issue and help add to the global denuclearization momentum?
It's time for Obama to go back to the pledge of direct diplomacy he made during his campaign days.
Two things stand in his way. First, now that he is the leader of the free world, he can little afford to give the impression that he will reward the rogue state for bad behavior. This would definitely make him look weak and remind the world of Chamberlain-style appeasement.
So he would be better off not reaching out to the North for now. Second, the world is already roiled by the North's ``missile test-fire,'' so making any dovish gesture would be tantamount to a political boneheaded play.
Still, what is important is that he should consider an eventuality of a one-on-one meeting with the bad guy when it comes to a decisive stage. This perspective fits his direct diplomacy and could save him from some potential crises the Clinton administration endured together with the rest of the world before the Agreed Framework was ironed out.
There is a Korean saying that, irrespective of a beeline or a roundabout, the most important thing is to get to Seoul. A dispute to the relevance of this saying is that a briefer trip would be better. The same logic goes with the North Korean odyssey that Obama has just started.
Of course, why would he have to risk his political capital to reach out to Pyongyang (Kim Jong-il is by no means a charming Penelope)?
This is a whole new question, but here is a clue. It is a foregone conclusion that Kim will never give up his nukes because they are the only viable bargaining chip he has to gain prestige and blackmail neighbors for protection money.
A change of tack would be to create an environment in which Kim will not see any incentives to use the nuclear card. For one, exclusion would not be an answer. I leave the rest of this jigsaw puzzle to the readers.
At a more practical turn, the six-party format is worth giving a second thought. First, it has served its purpose, above all because it looks ineffective. For starters, the number of its member states should be reduced, perhaps down to four, with a higher level of representation.
One flaw with election democracy is a lack of policy continuity. Of course, on the flip side, it is also its beauty. I hope that Obama will ride on the better end of it, not just for his political legacy. My peace of mind ― and that of a lot of others ― is at stake as well.