By Andy Jackson
Will the last person out of Gaeseong please turn off the lights?
It will probably not come to that but that has not stopped executives of companies doing business in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Pyongyang's ``sunshine'' friends in South Korea from hitting the panic button.
North Korea's decision to reduce the number of South Korean staffers in Gaeseong was ostensibly done in retaliation for the Lee Myung-bak administration's failure to prevent civic organizations from launching balloons loaded with anti-Kim Jong-il leaflets towards the North and for Lee's supposed hostile attitude towards Pyongyang.
However, these kinds of provocations and backsliding are standard procedure for the North and nobody should be surprised when they do it again.
When thinking about the current difficulties South Korean companies in Gaeseong are facing, an old proverb comes to mind; ``Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.''
In the 1970s, a consortium of European banks made loans to North Korea to finance industrial development. By 1987, Pyongyang had defaulted on those loans. North Korea has also defaulted on debts to Japan, although it services its debt to Russia by providing slave labor for logging camps in Siberia.
Did the ``running dogs'' of South Korean business really think that they would do any better? Considering North Korea's record with foreign investors, it is hardly a shock it would not care how its actions would affect the South Korean businesses that have invested in the Gaeseong complex.
(Yes, South Koreans are ``foreign investors'' in North Korea.)
By now the idea that Seoul could somehow buy leverage over Pyongyang through economic aid and cooperation should be thoroughly discredited. The North may care about losing money because of its actions, but internal political factors will always outweigh economic ones in Pyongyang.
In fact, it is the North that has gained leverage over the South through its ability to hurt South Korean business. Since Pyongyang's latest temper tantrum began, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex Tenant Companies' Association has begged President Lee to alter his policy towards North Korea. For its part the Lee administration has started looking for a legal excuse to shut down the leaflet balloon launches.
Of course, we should not overlook that North Korea is likely restricting border crossings for reasons other than showing displeasure with Lee Myong-bak.
Kim Jong-il's reported deteriorating health limits his control over the government and has increased behind-the-scenes maneuvering in the struggle to succeed him. Within that context, the border restrictions are more a matter of maintaining internal order during a time of political uncertainty in North Korea than an act of diplomatic brinksmanship.
Pyongyang has also restricted overland travel to and from China, constricting another financial lifeline for the financially strapped regime and lending further credence to the theory that the Gaeseong travel restrictions are based on the internal situation in North Korea.
For its part, China has again beefed up its military presence on the border as it periodically does during sensitive periods in either country.
The restrictions on the Gaeseong complex should also be viewed in the context of Pyongyang's general backtracking on economic reforms over the past four years, and a desire to limit the political damage of too much interaction between North and South Koreans.
In an interview with the online journal ``The Daily NK'' in China on November 13, a North Korean laid out Pyongyang's concern about the complex; ``From the Party's view, each worker in Mt. Geumgang and Gaeseong is like a poster advertising capitalism. Due to them, our socialist system could be cracked.''
It is foolish enough for Seoul to have to beg Pyongyang for the privilege of giving them more money. How much more foolish would it be for Seoul to make concessions to Pyongyang to encourage them to ease restrictions on the Gaeseong complex when the latter is clamping down for reasons that have little or nothing to do with South Korean policy?
Pyongyang already has every economic incentive to keep the Gaeseong complex open. Giving them more concessions now will not change their behavior and will give Seoul even less leverage when Pyongyang eventually does decide to talk again. You cannot bargain with something you have already given away.
Rather than being panicked into offering yet more economic aid to North Korea or restricting the rights of South Korean citizens on Pyongyang's behalf, the Lee Myung-bak administration should take a wait-and-see approach to the situation. The current uncertainty in North Korea and the presidential transition in the United States give President Lee all the excuse he needs to do just that.
Andy Jackson teaches American government in the Lakeland College bridge program at Ansan College, Gyeonggi Province. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com