By Andy Jackson
Last month's highly amicable summit between Presidents Lee Myung-bak and George W. Bush has been hailed as a kind of rebirth of the alliance. The Dong-A Ilbo was not alone in its feelings when it said in an April 21st editorial that the summit had ``dispelled mistrust and misunderstanding that had built up for the past 10 years."
It is true that the alliance had being going through a rocky patch over the past decade and that relations are improving with the new administration in the Blue House.
However, those who are expecting a renaissance in U.S.-Korean relations will likely be disappointed, if for no other reason than the fact that the relationship was not as close to being in a terminal phase as is often imagined.
A quick review of the history and dynamic of the relationship between the two long-term allies reveals why.
There have been major differences between Korea and the United States throughout the course of the relationship, many of them more serious than what we have seen over the past decade (certainly more serious than the current beef issue). A few come immediately to mind.
During the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee was aghast at moves by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to end the Korean War without completing the unification of the country and did everything within his power to sabotage negotiations, most famously by a mass release of North Korean POWs who swore loyalty to the ROK.
Similarly, during the DMZ War in the late 1960s, President Park Chang-hee wanted to reply aggressively to North Korean incursions, especially after a team of assassins got within 500 meters of the Blue House in 1968. However, Lyndon Johnson did want to open up a second front with the war in Vietnam raging and would only support a containment strategy.
Strains between the allies during the height of that conflict progressed to the point that the Park administration even threatened to withdraw Korean forces from Vietnam.
Perhaps the single greatest threat to the post-war relationship between Korean and the United States came from President Jimmy Carter. After his inauguration in 1977, Carter spent the first three years of his presidency seeking the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. He did so against the advice of his own intelligence officials on the threat that North Korea posed and without consulting Seoul.
Only consistent opposition from Congressed and within Carter's own administration prevented what would have effectively been the unilateral termination of the alliance. Coming so soon after the fall of Saigon in 1975, one can only imagine how Kim Il-sung would have interpreted such a hasty withdrawal. (If the alliance can survive four years of Jimmy Carter, it can survive almost anything.)
In the early 1990s, President Kim Young-sam was surprised and shocked to find out how close the United States had come to exercising ``cruise missile diplomacy" over North Korea nuclear weapons program and argued strongly against it.
The alliance survived those crises, as well as the recent ``decade of mistrust," because it remains relevant to the strategic needs of both partners. It will likely remain relevant as long as the two sides maintain their parts of the bargain.
For the United States, that means being firm in its defense of Korea. With the exception of the previously mentioned Carter administration, the United States has been remarkably consistent in maintaining its defense commitment to Korea. That commitment provided a shield behind which Korea was able to achieve its remarkable economic growth and transition to democratic rule.
Even in the event of the fall of the Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea, a continued American military presence in a united Korea could have value for Seoul. Sandwiched as it is between China, Japan and Russia, the Korean government could use America's clear commitment to its defense to prevent it from being drawn into future struggles between other regional powers.
For its part, Korea's side of the bargain was simple enough through the Cold War; maintain a local bulwark in the global struggle against communism. Korea more than lived up to its commitment, having sent over two divisions to fight in the Vietnam War.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Korea's role in the alliance has become more complicated. With the Cold War over and American-Chinese relations in comparatively good shape, there is relatively little that Korea can add to enhance American interest in the region.
So Korea maintains the utility of the alliance for its partner through a thousand services great and small. This can be seen in Korean troop commitment to Iraq, which former president Roh Moo-hyun authorized despite seeing them as a ``historic mistake."
Korea also sent troops to Afghanistan and, after being forced to withdraw them during last year's hostage crisis, is likely to either recommit troops or send civilian aid workers later this year.
The recent purchase of the aging but still highly effective F-15 Eagle over more modern European designs may have also been influenced by America's unique after-purchase plan; a promise to aid Korea in fighting against any enemy that tries to shoot those plans down.
Not inconsequentially, the United States can also continue to count on Korean support on international issues and in international forums as long as there are no direct conflicts with Korean national interests. That is a favor that the United States, with its commitments to partners around the world, is not in a position to return.
So Presidents Lee and Bush are not in the process of saving an alliance on the brink; they are improving on an alliance that continues to serve the interests of both countries well.
Andy Jackson teaches American government in the Lakeland College bridge program at Ansan College, Gyeonggi Province. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com.