By Andy Jackson
After recent contests in Texas and Ohio, the presidential campaign of Barack Obama was quick to point out that it is now virtually impossible for Hillary Clinton to secure the Democratic nomination for president in the primaries.
What they failed to mention is that it is now equally impossible for Obama to do so.
There are simply not enough delegates let up for grabs in the remaining primaries for either candidate to gain the nomination. The eventually winner will have to rely on the votes of so-called super delegates, 795 elected officials and other party fat cats, to prevail.
Complicating matters further, much of Obama's current small lead in the delegate count (he is about 100 ahead) would be wiped out if delegates from Florida and Michigan are seated at the convention.
Both states were striped of their delegates by the Democratic National Committee for moving their primaries before the period allowed by party rules. Clinton won in Florida with 49.8 percent of the 32.9 percent vote (with the rest going to other candidates). Under party rules, that means Clinton would get 105 delegates to 67 for Obama and 13 for John Edwards if they were seated at the Democratic national convention in August.
Michigan would be an even bigger headache for Obama. Obama and Edwards supporters had to settle for voting ``uncommitted'' after those candidates withdrew their names from the ballot there. Clinton's 55 percent in Michigan would be enough for 79 delegates. Even if every uncommitted delegate were to commit to Obama, he would still get only 55.
If the Democratic Party chooses to recognize the Florida and Michigan delegates, it would put Clinton within striking distance of Obama with 12 mores states and territories yet to vote.
So Obama has an incentive to play hardball with regards to nomination rules in order to neutralize Clinton's advantage in those states. However, in the process of doing so, he risks alienating voters in two states that will be crucial in the November general election as well as angering consequential numbers of working-class voters and older women who make up an important part of Clinton's base of support.
While greatly differing in the particulars, Lee Myung-bak also faced struggles over nomination rules in his fight with Park Geun-hye for the presidential candidacy of the Grand National Party last spring and summer, struggles that threatened to spill over into the general election.
Like the Democrats, the GNP faced favorable political terrain after two terms out of power. If anything, former President Roh's low popularity meant that the GNP enjoyed an even stronger position than the Democrats do today. The fact that the GNP nominee would have the inside track to the Blue House made the stakes in the party's nomination fight that much higher.
Issues of contention in the GNP nomination included candidate screening, the date of the nominating convention and at what ratio public opinion polls would count towards the nomination. On each of those disagreements, Lee either compromised or assented to Park's demands.
The GNP nomination period was originally supposed to end by June 2007, but Lee agreed to Park's suggestion to party officials that it be moved back to August.
Park claimed the delay was to allow the other parties as little time as possible to attack the eventual nominee. However a cynic would certainly be forgiven for believing the delay was mainly designed to give Park more time to eat into Lee's overwhelming lead in public support.
Later, the candidates and their supporters in the party clashed on the nomination formula. Lee, far ahead in public opinion polls, wanted to increase the weight of non-party members in the process. Park balked at the prospect of having her advantage among party members and officials nullified by increased non-party voting and Lee had to settle for a compromise formula.
Lee also eventually agreed to a public vetting process championed by Park, which subjected all the candidates to an internal party investigation and made them face potentially embarrassing questions from a panel of GNP leaders on national television. Lee, the subject of numerous accusations of ethical lapses, had earlier objected to the vetting as potential venue for intra-party mudslinging.
Lee made all those concessions while he was enjoying a huge advantage over Park in public opinion polls. By the time of the nominating primaries and convention on August 19, Park had managed to erode much of Lee's lead. Lee escaped with the nomination after winning by less than 2 percent of the vote.
Lee would have almost certainly enjoyed a larger margin of victory had he stuck to his guns on the nominating rules. Perhaps he would not have conceded so much if he realized how close the vote would eventually be.
However, Lee's concessions were not done out of charity. By giving in to Park's demands and making compromises, he made it virtually impossible for her supporters to claim that the nomination process was unfair.
Park had bolted from the party before, during the 2002 election, after complaining about the nominating process. Lee could ill afford her leaving again in 2007 and splitting the party before the election. Giving ground to Park was the price Lee had to pay in order to maintain party unity.
The wisdom of Lee's concessions became evident later that fall when Park endorsed him over former GNP presidential candidate Lee Hoi-chang, who ran as a conservative independent candidate.
So, what would Lee Myung-bak do about Michigan and Florida?
If past is prolog he would probably offer to support seating the Florida delegates based on that state's vote or at least agree to have a second primary. Michigan would have to have a second primary, a vote in which Obama would almost certainly cut Clinton's delegate count in the state.
Anything less (including replacing the primaries with caucuses) would risk losing voters in two states that Obama must win in November if he is to have any chance of beating McCain.
Like Lee's concessions to Park, Obama's concessions on Florida and Michigan would not be charity. They would be an essential part of preparing the way for victory in November.
Andy Jackson teaches American government in the Lakeland College bridge program at Ansan College, Gyeonggi Province. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com