By Andy Jackson
How much damage has the deal with the Taliban done to Korea? The kidnapped Christian aid workers (minus the two who were murdered by the Taliban) had returned home from Afghanistan, but only to find the second-guessing and accusations for their reckless mission.
When the hostage situation broke out, the Korean government had two options available that would have allowed it to retain credibility on the international stage. The first option would have been to essentially ignore the kidnappers, letting them know that the Korean government cannot be blackmailed and leaving any negotiations to intermediaries.
The harsh reality is that missionaries and aid workers are attacked, kidnapped or killed with numbing regularity worldwide. Dozens are killed every year.
The sheer number of incidents dictates that nations that send out large numbers of aid workers and missionaries have to accept a certain number of deaths each year or find themselves bogged down by such episodes.
With the increase in the number of Koreans engaging in those activities, it is only natural that their mortality rates will increase.
But Korea’s comparative inexperience with these kinds of incidents and the relatively large number of hostages involved made that option politically difficult for the Roh administration.
A second option would have been to let the Taliban know in no uncertain terms that harming Koreans will not go unanswered. We don’t know what the Korean government may have said to the Taliban privately but there is no indication that Seoul planned any retaliatory measures or made any plans to attempt to rescue the hostages.
The Roh administration chose a third way, which was essentially to give in to blackmail but haggle over the price.
The Taliban had allegedly demanded a $500,000 ransom for each of the 21 living hostages. The Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported that the Korean government paid the Taliban $2 million and a Taliban spokesman claimed that they received $20 million.
The Korean government denied that any ransom was paid. It will take some time to know the truth of those denials; it took three years before the secret payment of $500 million to Pyongyang for the 2000 inter-Korean summit was confirmed.
Even if there was no ransom, Korea’s participation has become a net loss in the struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan. Any gains that have been made by Korea’s good work there (in the form of a few hundred non-combat troops and aid workers) has been more than offset by the damage done by this deal.
The Taliban have increased their status in Afghanistan by showing that they can bend a foreign government to their will. The deal will also encourage other terrorist groups to kidnap foreign nationals, especially Koreans, as a means of achieving their goals.
To add insult to injury, Taliban spokesman Qari Yousaf Ahmadi wrote in a letter to his ``Korean brothers and sisters” (printed in The Korea Times on August 31) that his organization has ``no enmity toward you.”
His letter went on to state that it was the American and Afghan governments, not the Taliban, which bore responsibility for the deaths of the two Korean aid workers. The letter also said that the Korean government was partially responsible for their deaths because it could not get the American and Afghan governments to cave in to Taliban demands on releasing some of its members from prison.
The letter is nothing more than a mockery of the Korean government and an insult to the Korean people.
Then there is the question of what, if anything, the Roh administration will do about the murder of two of its citizens by the Taliban after it had placed such high stakes on getting them all back safely.
If past performance is any indication, the answer is nothing, which does little to enhance Korea’s credibility on the world stage. Perhaps Canadian troops in southern Afghanistan can exact some retribution on Korea’s behalf.
International condemnation of Korea’s deal with the Taliban has been swift and blunt. Canada’s foreign minister said that such negotiations will ``only lead to further acts of terrorism.”
There has also been criticism from Germany, which maintains forces in Afghanistan and has refused to make a deal with the Taliban for the release of a German hostage kidnapped at about the same time as the Koreans.
Perhaps the strongest criticism has come from Afghanistan itself. Afghan Commerce Minister Amin Farhang said, ``This release under these conditions will make our difficulties in Afghanistan even bigger,” adding that it would encourage more Taliban attacks on humanitarian workers and other civilians.
Hopefully the Roh administration will be able find a way to make up for the damage the Taliban deal has done to Korea’s standing in the world. For all the talk of `soft power’ the things that buy international influence and show a nation’s commitment are blood and treasure.
The Roh administration has shown that it is not up for a confrontation with terrorists. That leaves money as the only means of at least partially resorting Seoul’s reputation. A $200 million aid package to the Afghan government and another $200 million to help pay the expenses of coalition forces in Afghanistan would be a start.
Andy Jackson teaches American government in the Lakeland College bridge program at Ansan College, Gyeonggi Province. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com.