By Choi Jong-kun
Associate Professor Dept. of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University.
President Park Geun-hye's visit to the United States achieved its primary goal, which is to confirm the deterrence commitment of the U.S. and make the united front against North Korea very credible.It takes two hands to clap. For any applause to sound nice, you need to have hands clapping at the right time with the right pressure.
For any alliances to endure more than a half-century, it requires a great deal of well-timed applause. The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has been like good applause.
We have a formidable enemy to contain, and that enemy, North Korea, perpetuated while its allies are long gone. Therefore, a summit between allies is carefully crafted to signal a display of unity and a firm deterrence commitment and make the enduring commitment look credible against its common enemy.
Throughout this very first summit and her debut as head of the state in international politics, she was able to lay out the values, direction and principles of her presidency, at the Oval office, Capitol Hill and business meetings.
The two presidents agreed to show no tolerance toward any provocation from the North while hinting that the door to dialogues and negotiations would remain open as long as the North endorsed its denuclearization commitment and international norms.
Both also made it explicit that the days when Pyongyang could enjoy awards and concessions by manipulating threats and crises were over and would not be repeated. She also unveiled her flagship foreign policy of "Trustpolitik," which aims to rebuild trust on the Korean Peninsula by exercising a smart combination of engagement with and containment of the North.
While the Blue House and the media outlets in Seoul herald the meaning of this "successful" summit, one has to seriously venture some conjecture on what the implication of the summit will be for South Korea and the Korean Peninsula.
For South Korea, while being able to reconfirm the US extended deterrence commitment, the Park administration will be billed with many invoices from the US to pay up for its extended commitment in the name of burden sharing.
The U.S. is likely to demand increases in Seoul's financial contribution to the US Forces in Korea up to 50 percent of the total maintenance expenditure, despite a previous agreement to cap the rate of increase according to the inflation rate.
Moreover, the U.S. may pressure the government to acquire US-made high-tech arms for the sake of increasing inter-operability. This means Seoul's efforts to beef up its active deterrence posture is more likely to be determined not by the efficiency and effectiveness of the required weapon systems but by the political logics of the alliance. For the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang must have had paid keen attention to this summit.
It might have wanted to see what kinds of signal would come out for initiating the trust process on the Korean Peninsula. What puzzles many people is that warning Pyongyang is one thing, but there was no formula to award the North if it concedes.
Both leaders only showcased the deterrence commitment, not a pathway to reconciliation with the North. No one mentioned how the Gaesong Industrial Complex would be restored or how Seoul could ignite the cold engine of inter-Korean dialogue. Only the sharp voice of deterrence echoed. We did not hear a cheering voice for reconciliation.
An alliance needs an enemy, credible commitments and mutual benefits and burden sharing. Again, it takes two hands to clap. An enduring alliance perseveres only when mutual and fair benefits are warranted. The alliance serves the national interest, not vice versa. Our alliance should serve our interest, not our interest serve our alliance.
Associate Professor Dept. of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University.
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For any alliances to endure more than a half-century, it requires a great deal of well-timed applause. The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has been like good applause.
We have a formidable enemy to contain, and that enemy, North Korea, perpetuated while its allies are long gone. Therefore, a summit between allies is carefully crafted to signal a display of unity and a firm deterrence commitment and make the enduring commitment look credible against its common enemy.
Throughout this very first summit and her debut as head of the state in international politics, she was able to lay out the values, direction and principles of her presidency, at the Oval office, Capitol Hill and business meetings.
The two presidents agreed to show no tolerance toward any provocation from the North while hinting that the door to dialogues and negotiations would remain open as long as the North endorsed its denuclearization commitment and international norms.
Both also made it explicit that the days when Pyongyang could enjoy awards and concessions by manipulating threats and crises were over and would not be repeated. She also unveiled her flagship foreign policy of "Trustpolitik," which aims to rebuild trust on the Korean Peninsula by exercising a smart combination of engagement with and containment of the North.
While the Blue House and the media outlets in Seoul herald the meaning of this "successful" summit, one has to seriously venture some conjecture on what the implication of the summit will be for South Korea and the Korean Peninsula.
For South Korea, while being able to reconfirm the US extended deterrence commitment, the Park administration will be billed with many invoices from the US to pay up for its extended commitment in the name of burden sharing.
The U.S. is likely to demand increases in Seoul's financial contribution to the US Forces in Korea up to 50 percent of the total maintenance expenditure, despite a previous agreement to cap the rate of increase according to the inflation rate.
Moreover, the U.S. may pressure the government to acquire US-made high-tech arms for the sake of increasing inter-operability. This means Seoul's efforts to beef up its active deterrence posture is more likely to be determined not by the efficiency and effectiveness of the required weapon systems but by the political logics of the alliance. For the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang must have had paid keen attention to this summit.
It might have wanted to see what kinds of signal would come out for initiating the trust process on the Korean Peninsula. What puzzles many people is that warning Pyongyang is one thing, but there was no formula to award the North if it concedes.
Both leaders only showcased the deterrence commitment, not a pathway to reconciliation with the North. No one mentioned how the Gaesong Industrial Complex would be restored or how Seoul could ignite the cold engine of inter-Korean dialogue. Only the sharp voice of deterrence echoed. We did not hear a cheering voice for reconciliation.
An alliance needs an enemy, credible commitments and mutual benefits and burden sharing. Again, it takes two hands to clap. An enduring alliance perseveres only when mutual and fair benefits are warranted. The alliance serves the national interest, not vice versa. Our alliance should serve our interest, not our interest serve our alliance.
