By Chung Min-uck
Measures against further North Korean nuclear and missile tests adopted in the recent U.N. Security Council (UNSC) statement is not as strong as Seoul officials believe, a U.S. expert said Sunday.
In an interview with The Korea Times, Bruce Klinger, a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, said even if the reclusive nation carries out a third nuclear test, this will not automatically lead to stronger anti-Pyongyang action by the international community.
“After having discussions with officials in Seoul, I found out that they are describing the trigger-clause as very specific measure indicating if North Korea conducts a nuclear test, the recent UNSC presidential statement requires a follow-on Security Council resolution,” he said. “But if you look at the actual wording of the presidential statement, it’s very vague. Certainly, China which acts as defense attorney (of North Korea) at the Security Council would claim that the clause does not require an automatic Security Council resolution. South Korean officials and perhaps even those from the U.S. may argue differently. But certainly it is not as clear cut as they believe it to be.”
Klinger was referring to the so-called “trigger clause” that indicates the council’s determination to take action in the event of another North Korean launch or nuclear test.
Experts here believe the statement to have taken further steps on cornering the Stalinist state to blunt their nuclear ambitions and dangerous brinkmanship.
However, Klinger claimed the newly adopted statement will allow Beijing to play favorites with their long-time ally.
“It is always a question how China will respond (to a North Korea nuclear test),” he said. “Is it going to be the China of 2006 and 2009 that was so angry at North Korea’s provocations that they were willing to agree to UNSC resolutions? Or is it the China of 2010 that refused to accept clear evidence of the sinking of the Cheonan and refusing to allow any kind of actions in response to Yeonpyeong Island attack which was yet another violation.”
In 2010, Beijing denied Pyongyang’s involvement in the torpedoing of the South Korean warship and also refused to adopt a statement against Pyongyang’s shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island.
Meanwhile, concerns are growing whether the North will carry out a third underground nuclear test following those in 2006 and 2009. Both came on the heels of long-range missile launches.
Experts say Beijing’s dubious position is in line with their main objective to prioritize stability on the Korean Peninsula more than anything else. They say China’s primary concern is a flood of North Korean refugees if the regime collapses and a unification led by South Korea leading to U.S. military presence north of the 38th parallel.
“It is consistent with their objective,” said the U.S. expert. “China doesn’t like a nuclear North Korea. It doesn’t like a provocative North Korea that violates UNSC resolutions. But it is unwilling to punish North Korea when it breaks them. So they are willing to turn a blind eye in the hope of preventing a crisis.”
A UNSC resolution, compared to a presidential statement, is considered a stronger level of condemnation carried out by the 15-member U.N. Security Council. If adopted, it is likely to impose additional sanctions in line with those put on Pyongyang under the previous Security Council resolutions in 2006 and 2009.
In the presidential statement announced on April 16, the Security Council directed its DPRK Sanctions Committee to update activities about already-designated individuals and entities in relation to Pyongyang’s ballistic missile programs and designate additional entities and items within 15 days.
If the committee fails to meet the deadline of May 1, the Security Council will do so within an additional five days, according to the statement.